西方自由主义的困境

A gaggle of students are driving at high speed to Berlin. “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, / But to be young was very heaven,” wrote Wordsworth about the French Revolution. The year is 1989, not 1789, but the poet’s sentiments capture our mood. Having grown up under the Cold War’s nuclear shadow, the temptation to catch a glimpse of its physical demise was irresistible. The instant we heard East Germany had opened Checkpoint Charlie, uniting Berlin, we were on our way. Within 18 hours we were chipping at that wall alongside tens of thousands of others, young and old, German and foreign. With chisels and pickaxes we made our tiny contributions. Two days later we returned to England, hungover, astonished to have avoided any speeding tickets, each carrying a small chunk of the wall.

一群学生驾车高速向柏林驶去。“幸福啊，活在那个黎明之中，年轻人更是如进天堂，”华兹华斯(Wordsworth)对法国大革命有感而发地写道。虽然那一年是1989年，而不是1789年，但诗人华兹华斯表达的情绪正契合我们的心情。对于在冷战核阴影下长大的我们而言，亲眼目睹冷战结束标志性一幕的诱惑是不可抗拒的。一听说东德打开了东、西柏林之间的查理检查哨(Checkpoint Charlie)，我们就上路了。不到18个小时之后，我们就和成千上万的民众(有老有少，有德国人也有外国人)一起凿着那堵墙。我们用凿子和镐做出了绵薄的贡献。两天后，我们返回英格兰，酒还没醒，却惊讶地发现没有收到超速罚单，每个人都带回了墙上的一小块砖头。

We were infected with optimism. As a student of philosophy, politics and economics at Oxford, I imagined I possessed insight into the significance of the moment. PPE’s detractors called it a “pretty poor education”. They may have had a point. But in that moment, studying it seemed pertinent. We subscribed to progress, or rather Progress — belief in which is the closest thing the modern west has to a religion. In 1989 its schism was healed. By unifying its booming western wing with the shrivelled post-Stalinist eastern one, a monumental roadblock had been cleared from our future. No longer would nuclear-armed camps face each other across the 20th-century bloodlands of central Europe. That riven continent, from which Britain no longer stood aloof, would unify. Democracies would take the place of the Warsaw Pact, whose regimes were falling like dominoes to peaceful demonstrators. It was not just autocracy that was dying but nationalism. Borders were opening up. As the historian Eric Hobsbawm was to write, the short and genocidal 20th century, which began with the first world war in 1914, was about to come to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Humanity had proved it could learn from its mistakes. It was a good time to turn 21.

我们受到了乐观情绪的感染。作为牛津大学(Oxford)一名学习哲学、政治学及经济学(PPE)专业的学生，我感觉自己对这一时刻的意义拥有洞察力。这一跨学科专业的批评者称其为一项“相当糟糕的教育”。他们或许有道理。但在那一刻，学习这个专业似乎是有用的。我们赞同进步的信念，这是现代西方最接近宗教的信仰。在1989年，现代西方的分裂被弥合了。通过将蓬勃发展的西德与萎靡的后斯大林主义的东德统一起来，我们为未来清除了一块巨大的障碍。在中欧这片20世纪的血染大地上，再也不会出现不同核武阵营相互对峙。英国不再冷漠对待的这块撕裂的大陆将联合起来。民主国家将取代华约(Warsaw Pact)，这一组织旗下的政权在和平示威者面前像多米诺骨牌一样倒下。走向消亡的不只是独裁政权，还有民族主义。各国的边界开放了。正如历史学家艾瑞克•霍布斯鲍姆(Eric Hobsbawm)写道，始于1914年第一次世界大战的短暂而血腥的20世纪，即将以苏联的解体而结束。人类已证明可以从错误中汲取教训。现在是走向21世纪的好时候。

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Almost three decades later, in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory, I found myself in Moscow. I had been invited to attend a conference on the “polycentric world order”, which is Russian for “post-American world”. It was hosted by the Primakov Institute, named after the man who had been Russia’s foreign minister and prime minister during the 1990s. Yevgeny Primakov was displaced as prime minister in 1999 by Vladimir Putin. While my friends and I had danced on the rubble of the Berlin Wall, a brooding Putin had watched his world crumbling from 100 miles away, at his KGB office in Dresden, a city in what was still East Germany. Later he would describe the USSR’s dissolution as the “greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century”. It was Primakov who championed the term “multipolarity” in a vain bid to dampen America’s oceanic post-Cold War triumphalism. Putin picked up the concept and made it his own.

将近30年后，在2016年唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)赢得美国大选后，我来到了莫斯科，受邀参加一个讨论“多中心世界秩序”的会议，这是俄罗斯对“后美国世界”的表述。这次会议由普里马科夫研究所(Primakov Institute)主办，该所以上世纪90年代担任过俄罗斯外长和总理的叶夫根尼•普里马科夫(Yevgeny Primakov)的名字命名。1999年，弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)取代普里马科夫成为总理。当我和我的朋友们在柏林墙的废墟上手舞足蹈时，100英里外，陷入沉思的普京正从克格勃(KGB)位于东德城市德累斯顿的办公室眼睁睁地看着眼前的世界崩塌下来。后来，他把苏联解体形容为“20世纪最大的地缘政治灾难”。普里马科夫曾倡导“多极化”概念，徒劳地试图削弱美国冷战后的必胜信念。普京接受了这一概念，并将其作为自己的理念。

Now here I was at an event attended by the likes of Alexander Bortnikov, head of the FSB (successor to the KGB), and by Putin himself. Though unsmiling, it was the Russians’ turn to celebrate. America had just elected a president who was a fan of walls and an admirer of Putin. While Putin was surveying his wrecked world in 1989, and we were racing down the autobahn, Trump was launching a board game. It was called Trump: The Game. With its fake paper money and property-based rules, it bore an uncanny resemblance to Monopoly — except that the number six on the dice was replaced with the letter T. There is no record that Trump said anything about the fall of the Berlin Wall. At any rate, all that seemed a long time ago.

现在我正在莫斯科参加上述会议，与会者还有俄罗斯联邦安全局(FSB，前身为克格勃)局长亚历山大•波特尼科夫(Alexander Bortnikov)等高官以及普京本人。尽管面无笑容，但轮到俄罗斯人庆祝了。美国刚选出一位热衷修筑隔离墙并且仰慕普京的总统。1989年，当普京环视眼前崩塌的世界而我们飞驰在高速公路上时，特朗普正发明一种名为“特朗普游戏”(Trump: The Game)的纸盘游戏。该游戏有假的纸币和基于地产的规则，极为类似“大富翁”(Monopoly)——除了骰子上的数字六被字母T替换之外。关于特朗普对柏林墙倒塌的看法，没有任何记录。无论如何，这一切似乎都已经很久远了。

What followed was a crash course in how to see the world differently. Still a student of history, though I hope by now a more sceptical one, I was struck by how often our Russian hosts referred admiringly to the Congress of Vienna. This was the 1814–15 conference that sealed the end of the Napoleonic Wars and launched almost a century of stability, which held until the outbreak of the first world war. The new order was underwritten by the Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia. Trump’s victory had opened up the prospect that Russia could return to its historic role as a great power in a polycentric world — one in which each forswore doing anything to undermine the internal legitimacy of any other. No more talk of the inevitability of democracy, or the US-led global order. That was what Putin craved. Others, in Beijing, Ankara, Cairo, Caracas, and even Budapest, share Russia’s hostility to western notions of progress, as do growing numbers of apostates in the west. Are they wrong?

接下来要学的是一门关于如何以不同的视角看世界的速成课程。作为一名仍在学习历史的学生，尽管我希望如今的自己能更具有怀疑精神，但还是被俄罗斯东道主如此频繁地赞美维也纳会议(Congress of Vienna)震住了。那场在1814年至1815年间召开的会议为拿破仑战争(Napoleonic Wars)画上了句号，开启了持续近一个世纪的稳定时期，直至第一次世界大战爆发。保障这一新秩序的是由英国、奥地利、普鲁士和俄罗斯组成的四国同盟(Quadruple Alliance)。特朗普胜选开启了一种前景，即俄罗斯可能重返其作为一个多中心世界强国的历史角色，而在这个多中心世界，每个国家都发誓不会做任何破坏别国内部合法性的事情。没人再去谈论民主的必然性或者美国主导的全球秩序。这正是普京梦寐以求的。在北京、安卡拉、开罗、加拉加斯，甚至布达佩斯，这些地方的人与俄罗斯一样敌视西方关于进步的观念，西方内部也有越来越多的人放弃这一观念。他们错了吗?

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To a person whose life has coincided with the rise of democracy, the spread of market economics and signs that the world had finally subscribed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, merely to pose this question is troubling enough. Wasn’t that debate settled a long time ago? Doesn’t the whole world crave to be western? We can no longer have any confidence in that. It was remarkably arrogant to believe the rest of the world would passively adopt our script. We must cast a sceptical eye on what we have learnt never to question.

对一个伴随着民主兴起、市场经济扩散以及全世界最终接受《世界人权宣言》(Universal Declaration of Human Rights)的种种迹象而成长的人来说，仅仅提出这一问题就足以令人不安。这场辩论不是很久以前已经尘埃落定了吗?整个世界不都渴望西方化吗?对于这一点，我们不能再抱有任何信心。认为世界其他国家会被动地采纳我们的信条，这种想法极为傲慢。我们必须用质疑的眼光看待那些我们曾被教育永远不要质疑的事情。

At stake is a quasi-religious reading of western history that stretches back to the Magna Carta, whose 800th anniversary was celebrated at Runnymede in 2015. By limiting the power of the king, the Magna Carta set a precedent for what would later be known as “no taxation without representation.” This short medieval document was lost to the mists for several hundred years — Shakespeare did not even mention it in his play King John. Yet since the 17th century, when the Magna Carta was dusted off by opponents of Stuart tyranny in England, then made its way to America’s 13 colonies, it has morphed into the founding myth of western liberalism. As Dan Jones, a historian of the Magna Carta, describes it, the year 1215 is today seen as the “year zero” of liberal democracy. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was issued after the second world war, Eleanor Roosevelt said that it “may well become the international Magna Carta for all men everywhere”.

这关系到对可追溯至《大宪章》(Magna Carta)的西方历史的类似宗教的解读。2015年，兰尼米德(Runnymede)举行了《大宪章》签署800周年庆祝活动。通过限制国王的权力，《大宪章》为后来众所周知的“无代表不纳税”原则开创了先例。这份简短的中世纪文件在随后几百年里消失在了迷雾之中——甚至连莎士比亚(Shakespeare)都没在历史剧《约翰王》(King John)中提到它。然而，自17世纪《大宪章》被英格兰斯图亚特王朝暴政的反对者拂去表面的灰尘并传播到北美洲的13个殖民地之后，它演变为西方自由主义的奠基理念。正如研究《大宪章》的历史学家丹•琼斯(Dan Jones)所言，1215年如今被视为自由民主之“元年”。当《世界人权宣言》在二战后发布时，埃莉诺•罗斯福(Eleanor Roosevelt)曾说，这份宣言“完全可以成为全人类的国际宪章”。

For centuries, westerners have held a linear faith in which time is always marching us towards a happier place. The Greeks called it teleology. For Christians, it was the Second Coming of Christ. For Marxists, it was the dictatorship of the proletariat. For nationalists, it was seizing control of their Volk destiny. For Georgian and Victorian liberals on both sides of the Atlantic, and their modern heirs across the western world, it was the progress of human liberty to individual freedom. In 1989 most people believed that last version. The others were either dead or in retreat. Today, only Marxism is dormant. Belief in an authoritarian version of national destiny is staging a powerful comeback. More to the point, non-western visions of history, which were overshadowed by colonial rule, are restaking their claim to relevance. In different ways, China and India have traditionally taken a circular view of history. They still do. Material conditions may improve. But humanity’s moral condition is constant. There is no political finale towards which history is guiding us. To the rest of the world, which accounts for almost nine-tenths of humanity, most of whom are now finally starting to catch up with the west’s material advantages, humankind’s moral progress is a question that can never be settled. History does not end. It is a timeless repetition of folly and correction.

数世纪以来，西方人秉持的是线性信仰，认为时间总是会带我们走向更加幸福的地方。希腊人称之为目的论。对于基督徒而言，那就是耶稣再临。对于马克思主义者而言，那就是无产阶级专政。对于民族主义者而言，那就是掌握人民命运的控制权。对于乔治王朝和维多利亚时期大西洋两岸的自由主义者、以及他们在整个西方世界的现代后嗣而言，那就是从人类解放迈向个人自由的进步。1989年，多数人都秉持最后一个版本的信仰。其他版本要么消亡了，要么倒退了。如今，只有马克思主义处于休眠之中。对民族命运的独裁版信仰正强势地重新回到舞台。说得更确切些，曾因殖民统治而蒙上阴影的非西方版本的历史正在重申它们的重要性。中国和印度以不同的方式传统上对历史采取一种循环往复的观点。他们现在依旧秉持这种观点。物质条件或许改善了。但人类的道德状况依旧。历史没有把我们引向任何一种政治结局。对于世界其他地区(生活着将近90%的人类，其中多数人如今终于开始追上西方的物质优势了)而言，人类的道德进步是一个永远无法解决的问题。历史没有终点。它永恒地重复着犯错和改正。

Those who doubt the circular view should look at US history. In 1789, the newly independent American colonies had a life expectancy of barely 40. It took 12 days by coach and boat for Thomas Jefferson to make the journey from his home in Virginia to Philadelphia. Today life expectancy is nearly twice that and Jefferson’s route takes five hours. Now measure America’s story by another yardstick. America’s first president, George Washington, was a world historical figure who cemented America’s democratic character by refusing to wear his general’s uniform for his inauguration. Against all exhortations, he stood down after two terms. He feared a third would set the wrong precedent. Can we say America’s moral progress has matched its material advances? In some ways it undoubtedly has. The US was born with slavery and women had no voice. But faith in the march towards “a more perfect union” is hard to sustain after President Trump’s election. Washington chose to be a modest statesman when the laurel was his for the taking. Trump, on the other hand, is a self-promoter without peer.

那些质疑这种循环往复观点的人应该看看美国历史。1789年，刚刚独立的美国殖民地的人均寿命只有区区40岁。托马斯•杰斐逊(Thomas Jefferson)坐了12天的马车和船才从位于弗吉尼亚州的家到达了费城。现在美国的人均寿命差不多是那时的两倍，而杰斐逊这段行程只需要5个小时。现在以另一种标准来衡量美国的历史。美国第一位总统乔治•华盛顿(George Washington)是一位世界级的历史人物，他拒绝在就职典礼上穿着将军制服，从而奠定了美国的民主性。他拒绝了一切谏言，在担任总统两个任期后毅然下台。他担心第三个任期会树立一个错误的先例。我们可以说美国的道德进步与物质改善相匹配吗?在某些方面，毫无疑问是这样的。美国诞生之时有奴隶制，女性没有话语权。但在特朗普总统胜选后，向“更完美的联邦”迈进的信仰难以为继了。当王冠唾手可得时，华盛顿选择成为一名谦逊的政治家。而另一方面，特朗普是一个举世无双的自吹自擂之人。

Of course, Trump and his counterparts in Europe, did not cause the crisis of democratic liberalism. They are a symptom. This may be hard to digest. Many comfort themselves that Trump’s victory was an accident delivered by the dying gasp of America’s white majority — and abetted by Putin. History will resume normal business after a brief interruption. They are too sanguine. Almost a quarter of America’s white working classes who voted for Barack Obama in 2008 switched to Trump in 2016. Had they, in Hillary Clinton’s unfortunate word, suddenly turned “deplorable”? Or were they driven by a desire to blow up a system that had routinely blamed them for their plight? The same can be asked of the Nissan employees in Sunderland who voted against their economic interests for Brexit. It may have been poetic coincidence that both David Cameron and Clinton stumbled on to the same campaign line: “Stronger together”. It should be little surprise that so many voters on both sides of the Atlantic responded so cynically. The Clintons have earned $235m in speaking fees since Bill Clinton left office — much of it from the same Wall Street banks who foreclosed on so many middle class homes. Within weeks of leaving office Obama accepted a $400,000 fee for a speech to a Wall Street firm — the same as the president’s salary. In the age of Trump, the appetite for Obama’s thoughts is likely to grow. But his fees are an all-too familiar monetisation of public office. The median US income only regained its pre-recession level at the end of Obama’s term in 2015. It is still below where it was at the turn of this century. Meanwhile, almost half of Americans now describe themselves as “lower class” — up from a third in 2000.

当然，特朗普和他在欧洲的同类并没有导致自由民主的危机。他们是症状。这可能很难理解。很多人自我安慰地认为，特朗普的胜利是在普京的帮助下由美国白人多数群体的垂死挣扎所导致的意外。在短暂的中断后，历史会重新恢复正常。他们太乐观了。曾在2008年投票支持巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)的美国白人工人阶级，有将近四分之一在2016年转而支持特朗普。用希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)令人遗憾的话来说，他们是突然变“可悲”的吗?还是说他们是受一种渴望的驱使，想要毁掉那个总是把他们的困境归咎到他们自己头上的系统?同样的问题也可以问问日产(Nissan)在桑德兰的员工，他们违背了自己的经济利益而投票支持了英国退欧。戴维•卡梅伦(David Cameron)和希拉里挑选了同样的竞选口号——“在一起更强大”(Stronger Together)，这或许是诗意的巧合。大西洋两岸的那么多选民都作出如此愤世嫉俗的反应，这应该没什么大惊小怪的。自从比尔•克林顿(Bill Clinton)离任之后，克林顿一家赚到了2.35亿美元的演讲费——其中很多都来自那些对众多中产阶级的房屋止赎的华尔街银行。在离任后几周内，奥巴马就为华尔街一家公司演讲而得到了40万美元——与总统的薪水一样多。在特朗普时代，商界可能更想知道奥巴马的想法了。但他的演讲费是司空见惯的对公职的货币化。2015年，在奥巴马任期末尾，美国收入中值才刚刚回到了衰退前的水平。目前仍然低于本世纪初的水平。与此同时，现在有将近一半的美国人形容自己是“下层阶级”——而2000年时的比例为三分之一。

The backlash of the west’s middle classes, who are the biggest losers in a global economy that has been rapidly converging, but still has decades to go, has been brewing for many years. In Britain we call them the “left-behinds”. In France, they are the “couches moyennes”. In America, they are the “squeezed middle”. A better term is the “precariat” — those whose lives are dominated by economic insecurity. More than 160m westerners now work in the so-called gig economy, according to the management consultancy McKinsey, a multiple of where it was five years ago. Of these, about a third do so “out of necessity”. Their numbers are forecast to rise sharply. Their share of US wealth keeps going the other way. The bottom 50 per cent of Americans now own just 1 per cent of the nation’s wealth.

作为一直快速融合(并且还要持续如此几十年)的全球经济中的最大输家，西方中产阶级的反弹已经酝酿了许多年。在英国，我们称他们“留守者”(left-behinds)。在法国，他们是couches moyennes。在美国，他们是“受挤压的中产”(squeezed middle)。一个更恰当的术语是“无保障无产阶级”(precariat)——生活上缺乏经济保障的人士。根据管理咨询公司麦肯锡(McKinsey)的数据，逾1.6亿西方人如今在所谓的零工经济(gig economy)中工作，数倍于5年前的人数。其中约三分之一是“出于需要”这么做。这部分人的数量预计还将大幅上升。但他们在美国财富中所占份额一直在下降。如今，收入最低的50%美国人仅占有本国财富的1%。

In 1966 Barrington Moore, the American sociologist, wrote, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.” In the coming years his proposition will be tested. Since the turn of the millennium, and particularly over the past decade, no fewer than 25 democracies have failed around the world, three of them in Europe (Russia, Turkey and Hungary). Poland may not be far behind. In all but Tunisia, the Arab Spring was swallowed by the summer heat. “It is an open question whether this is a market correction in democracy, or a global depression,” says Francis Fukuyama, the scholar who back in 1989 asked whether history had ended. The answer will be found in the US and other western democracies.

1966年，美国社会学家巴林顿•摩尔(Barrington Moore)曾写道：“没有中产阶级就没有民主。”在未来几年，他的观点将经受考验。自进入新千年以来，尤其是过去10年，全球不下25个民主国家出现了倒退，其中有3个国家位于欧洲(俄罗斯、土耳其和匈牙利)。波兰可能也为时不远了。除了在突尼斯，阿拉伯之春已被夏日热浪吞噬。“这是民主国家的市场调整还是全球经济萧条，仍有待商榷，”弗朗西斯•福山(Francis Fukuyama)说。学者福山早在1989年就提出了历史是否已经终结的问题。答案将取决于美国和其他西方民主国家。

Journalists are always liable to over-interpret the latest big thing. We are also prone to interpret what we did not foresee as serenely inevitable in hindsight. Bear in mind that Brexit was not destined to happen. Holding the referendum was a rash throw of the dice by an inept prime minister. Nor was Trump’s victory inevitable. If just 77,000 Midwestern votes had gone the other way Hillary Clinton would now be president. But it works both ways. Should Marine Le Pen lose the French election and Angela Merkel retain power in Germany, the crisis of western liberalism will not have suddenly ended, though I suspect it will be broadcast as such. Nor, for that matter, would America be secure if Clinton were now in the White House. The self-belief of western elites saps their ability to grasp the scale of the threat.

记者总是倾向于过度解读最新的大事件。我们也很容易在事后将我们未能预见到的事解释为不可避免。但请记住，英国退欧并非注定要发生。举行退欧公投是一位无能的首相轻率地掷出的骰子。特朗普的胜选也并非不可避免。如果中西部有7.7万张选票改投希拉里，她现在就是美国总统。但这一道理两方面都说得通。如果马琳•勒庞(Marine Le Pen)在法国大选中落败(英文刊发时法国大选还未结束——译者注)而安格拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel)仍执掌德国，西方自由主义的危机也不会突然结束，尽管我怀疑宣传上会如此说。因此，即使如今希拉里坐镇白宫，美国也不会高枕无忧。西方精英的自我信念削弱了他们判断威胁程度的能力。

Last December, Norbert Hofer, a hard right nationalist, came within a whisker of winning Austria’s presidency. We nevertheless celebrated his defeat as the crashing of the populist wave. We are likely to do the same if a French neo-fascist loses with about 40 per cent of the vote on Sunday. Le Pen’s Front National remains France’s largest party in two critical regional strongholds — the industrial north and Provence. As millions more French, British, American and other westerners move from secure jobs with pensions in the years ahead to contractual status without benefits, their sense of precariousness will intensify. “Take back control” may be an empty slogan in a world of inter-dependent sovereignty. But it means something tangible to those who have lost what they once thought was economic security. The western state used to insure individuals against the vicissitudes of the market. It is increasingly withdrawing from that role. Should Emmanuel Macron win the French election, supporters of liberal democracy, including me, must pray that he — and other leaders like him — will succeed. But he will have won on the basis of issuing vague, catch-all promises without a majority party to carry out his wishes. Obama offered similar hope in 2008 when his party was in full control. Eight years later America elected Trump.

去年12月，极右翼民族主义者诺贝特•霍弗(Norbert Hofer)只差一点点就赢得奥地利总统大选。但我们把他的失败当作民粹主义浪潮的折戟来庆祝。在法国的两大关键地区——工业化的北部地区和普罗旺斯地区，勒庞的国民阵线(Front National)仍是最大政党。今后，随着法国、英国、美国等西方国家数以百万计的民众失去可提供养老金的稳定工作，进入没有福利的合同工状态，他们的不安全感将加剧。在一个主权相互依赖的世界，“夺回控制权”或许只是一句空洞的口号。但对于那些失去了他们曾经认为的经济保障的人来说，这意味着看得见的实惠。西方国家曾经为个人免受市场兴衰影响提供保障。如今，它们正逐渐退出这一角色。如果埃马纽埃尔•马克龙(Emmanuel Macron)赢得法国大选(英文刊发时法国大选还未结束——译者注)，包括我在内的自由民主支持者一定会祈祷他以及像他一样的领导人取得成功。但他的胜选将建立在做出模糊、笼统的承诺的基础上，但没有一个议会多数党实现他的愿望。奥巴马在2008年民主党同时控制参众两院之际向美国人民提出了类似的希望。但8年后，美国人民选择了特朗普。

The west’s crisis was not invented in 2016. Nor will it vanish in 2017. It is structural and likely to persist. Those who gloss over this are doing liberal democracy no favours.

西方的危机并非在2016年才出现，也不会在2017年消失。这种危机是结构性的，很可能持续下去。那些粉饰危机的人对自由民主没有半点好处。