一名美军预备役军人被控为中国充当间谍
华盛顿——美国执法官员称，一名来自中国的美国陆军预备役军人星期二被捕，他被控秘密向一名中国情报官员提供美国国防承包商雇员的信息。美国官员还表示，中国政府试图招募他们作为线人。
The suspect, Ji Chaoqun, 27, was arrested in Chicago, where he attended graduate school before joining the Army Reserves, and charged with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FARA.
这名27岁的嫌疑人季超群(音)在芝加哥被捕。他曾在芝加哥读研究生，后来加入了美国陆军预备役部队。他被控违反《外国特工登记法》(Foreign Agents Registration Act，简称FARA)。
Mr. Ji’s handler at a regional arm of China’s Ministry of State Security, which collects domestic and foreign intelligence, was also arrested, according to an F.B.I. affidavit. The officer, identified only as Intelligence Officer A, was arrested sometime before April. It is not clear where he was arrested or by whom.
季超群的上线在中国国家安全部一个地方分支机构，他们搜集国内国外情报。根据美国联邦调查局(FBI)的一份证词，这名上线也被捕了。这名官员只被指认为“情报官员A”，在4月份之前被捕。目前还不清楚他是在哪里、被谁逮捕的。
An F.B.I. arrest of a Chinese intelligence officer would send a strong signal to China that American counterintelligence agents are keenly focused on its activities in the United States. Such an arrest would also be an embarrassment to Chinese intelligence, revealing sloppy tradecraft and exposing operations in the United States.
美国联邦调查局逮捕一名中国情报官员，等于是向它发出强烈信号，即美国的反间谍机构正密切关注中方在美国的活动。对中国情报机构来说，这样的逮捕也是一件尴尬的事，揭示出中国不佳的谍报技术，并暴露了它在美国的行动。
“By collecting this information for an arm of the Chinese government while in the United States, Ji knowingly and unlawfully acted as an agent of a foreign power,” Andrew K. McKay, an F.B.I. special agent, wrote in the affidavit.
“在美国期间，通过为中国一个政府部门收集这些信息，季在知情的情况下非法充当了外国势力的代理人，”联邦调查局特工安德鲁·K·麦凯(Andrew K. McKay)在证词中写道。
No lawyer was listed for Mr. Ji in court papers.
法庭文件中没有列出季超群的律师。
Chinese espionage has been one of the top concerns for the Justice Department’s national security division and the F.B.I.’s counterintelligence division. The Justice Department has also cracked down on FARA violations, most prominently the convictions of Paul Manafort, President Trump’s former campaign chairman, for his work consulting for the pro-Russia former president of Ukraine.
中国的间谍活动一直是美国司法部的国家安全部门以及美国联邦调查局反间谍部门最关心的问题之一。美国司法部也一直在打击违反《外国特工登记法》的行为，其中最引人注目的是特朗普总统前竞选主席保罗·马纳福特(Paul Manafort)由于为亲俄罗斯的乌克兰前总统提供咨询而被定罪。
Mr. Ji, who was born in Beijing, met three Chinese intelligence officers while he was still a student in China. Using an alias, his primary handler posed as a professor, and the men said they were members of a confidential unit and made oblique references to spycraft, according to court papers.
季超群出生在北京，他在中国读书时遇到了三名中国情报官员。法庭文件显示，他的主要上线用化名冒充成一名教授。这些人说他们来自一个保密单位，并拐弯抹角地提到了间谍活动。
The Ministry of State Security has maintained a large network of intelligence gatherers inside and outside China. Some harvest information overtly through their positions as attachés and academics, and others secretly as spies.
中国国家安全部在国内外维持着一个庞大的情报收集网络。有些人通过他们使馆随员和学者的职位公开获取信息，另一些人则秘密地充当间谍。
It is unusual for the regional department of the M.S.S., Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security, to run an operative in the United States, former officials said.
一些前官员表示，对于江苏省国家安全厅——国家安全部的地方分支来说，在美国运作一名特工是不寻常的。
Mr. Ji arrived in the United States on a student visa in August 2013 to earn his master’s degree in electrical engineering at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago. During his time in school, he traveled to China three times and met with his M.S.S. contact. Once they met at a hotel and another time at the local State Security office.
2013年8月，季超群持学生签证来到美国，在芝加哥的伊利诺伊理工学院(Illinois Institute of Technology)攻读电子工程硕士学位。在学校期间，他曾三次前往中国，并与他的联系人见面。一次，他们在酒店见面，还有一次在当地安全部门的办公室见面。
Before Mr. Ji graduated in 2015, his contact asked him to buy background check data on eight naturalized American citizens who were born in Taiwan or China. They all worked in, or had recently retired from, jobs in the science and technology industry. Several specialized in the aerospace industry, and seven had worked for defense contractors, law enforcement officials said.
在季超群于2015年毕业前，他的联系人让他购买八名归化美国公民的背景调查数据，这八人都在台湾或中国出生。他们都在科技行业工作，或者刚刚从这些行业退休。执法官员说，有几人专门从事航空航天工业，七人曾为国防承包商工作。
“They just wanted me to purchase some documents on their behalf,” Mr. Ji told the F.B.I. of his handlers, adding that they had told him that making the payments for the reports from China would be too onerous.
“他们只是想让我代表他们去购买一些文件，”季超群将他的上线信息告诉联邦调查局，并补充说，他们告诉他，从中国支付这些报告的费用太麻烦。
The F.B.I. contends that the M.S.S. was “testing Ji’s skills as a potential asset by tasking him to purchase these background check reports.”
联邦调查局表示，中国的安全部门“让他购买这些背景调查报告，以测试季超群作为潜在资产的技能”。
Mr. Ji emailed the files to his handler and called them “midterm test questions.”
季超群将这些文件通过电子邮件发给了自己的上线，并将它们命名为“期中考试题”。
He also asked an engineer to provide him with technical information from an unnamed aircraft engine supplier, a defense contractor that does aviation research for the military. He then provided the information to the Chinese government.
他还要求一名工程师向他提供一个未具名的飞机发动机供应商的技术信息，该供应商是一家为军方从事航空研究的国防承包商。随后，季超群把这些信息提供给了中国政府。
After graduating in 2015, Mr. Ji enlisted in the Army Reserves in the spring of 2016 under a program that allows immigrants to qualify for American citizenship in exchange for serving in the military.
2015年毕业后，季超群在2016年春天加入了陆军预备役，这个项目允许移民在军队服役换取美国公民身份。
As part of his application, Mr. Ji lied about his contacts with Chinese intelligence officials, according to court documents.
法庭文件显示，在申请中，季超群对自己与中国情报官员的接触撒了谎。
The Army began discharging such recruits this year before they could qualify for citizenship, lawyers said. It has recently halted the discharges.
律师们说，陆军今年开始在这些新兵有资格获得公民身份之前就解除他们的军籍。他们最近停止了这样的做法。
