特朗普的房地产式豪赌不适于核谈判

WASHINGTON — President Trump attempted a revolutionary approach to North Korea — a gamble that negotiating prowess and deal-making charm in a face-to-face meeting with Kim Jong-un could accomplish what no American president or diplomat had dared to attempt in the 65 years since an uneasy armistice settled over the Korean Peninsula.

华盛顿——特朗普总统试图用一种革命性的方式解决朝鲜问题，寄希望于在同金正恩(Kim Jong-un)举行面对面的会谈时，谈判技巧和促成交易的魔法，能够带来一个自65年前朝鲜半岛达成临时休战协议以来，任何美国总统或外交官都不敢想象的成就。

It was a bold and innovative approach, and one worth trying, to take on the related goals of a peace treaty and eradicating the North’s now-substantial nuclear arsenal.

为了实现两个相关的目标——签订和平条约，清除如今已经十分可观的朝鲜核武库——这样的方法是大胆而创新的，并且值得冒险尝试。

The fact that it fell on Thursday before getting out of the starting gate, though, underscored how little the two men understood about each other, or how their words and maximalist demands were resonating in Washington and Pyongyang.

但周四，这个办法还没启动就失败了。这个事实突显出两人对彼此了解甚少，并且他们的言论和极端要求在华盛顿和平壤引起了共鸣。

Mr. Trump approached the North Korean leader as if he was a competing property developer haggling over a prized asset — and assumed that, in the end, Mr. Kim would be willing to give it all up for the promise of future prosperity. So he started with threats of “fire and fury,’’ then turned to surprise initiatives, then gratuitous flattery of one of the world’s more brutal dictators.

特朗普把朝鲜领导人当成为了一处抢手的资产和他竞争的房地产开发商，以为金正恩最终会愿意完全放弃，以换取未来实现繁荣的承诺。因此，他一开始是发出“炮火与怒火”的威胁，之后转向出人意料的举动，然后是无谓地奉承这个世界上最残暴的独裁者之一。

“He will be safe, he will be happy, his country will be rich,” Mr. Trump said of the North Korean leader on Tuesday, as he met again with Moon Jae-in, the over-optimistic South Korean president whose national security adviser predicted, that same day, it was “99.9 percent” sure that the summit meeting in Singapore would go ahead.

“他会安全的，会高兴的，他的国家会富起来，”在周二再次会见过于乐观的韩国总统文在寅(Moon Jae-in)期间，特朗普提到朝鲜领导人时说。就在同一天，文在寅的国家安全顾问还预言称新加坡会面“99.9%”确定会如期举行。

But it was already becoming clear to Mr. Trump and his team that the techniques involved in negotiating real estate don’t translate easily into negotiations over nuclear weapons.

但当时，特朗普和他的团队已经清楚地认识到，把房地产谈判中的技巧运用到围绕核武器展开的谈判中并非易事。

Mr. Kim needs money, investment and technology for sure. But more than that, he needs to convince North Korea’s elites that he has not traded away the only form of security in his sole control — the nuclear patrimony of his father and his grandfather.

金正恩的确需要资金、投资和技术。但不仅如此，他还需要让朝鲜的权贵相信，他没有放弃由他独自掌控的唯一的安全保障：他的父亲和祖父留给他的核遗产。

“For them, ‘getting rich’ is a secondary consideration,’’ said William Perry, the former secretary of defense and one of the last people to negotiate with the North over peace treaties, nuclear disarmament and missiles — in 1999, when he was sent out as President Bill Clinton’s special envoy. “If I learned anything dealing with them, it’s that their security is pre-eminent. They know we have the capability to defeat them, and they believe we have the intent to do so.’’

“对他们来说，‘致富’是次要的考虑因素，”前国防部长威廉·佩里(William Perry)说。他是上一次同朝鲜就和平条约、核裁军和导弹问题举行谈判的人之一。那是1999年，他的身份是美国总统比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)的特使。“如果说我在和他们打交道的过程中学到了什么，那就是安全对他们来说是第一位的。他们知道我们有打败他们的实力，并且他们认为我们有这么做的打算。”

“And the only way to address that,” Mr. Perry, now 90, said this week in Palo Alto as the North Koreans were issuing their latest threats, “is with a step-by-step process, exactly the approach Trump said he did not want to take.”

本周，当朝鲜发出最新的威胁时，现年90岁的佩里在帕洛阿尔托说，“对此，唯一的解决办法是采用循序渐进的过程，这恰恰是特朗普说他不希望采用的。”

Other complications prevented the talks from making it far enough to even discuss those issues. As the two leaders circled each other over what long-range goals they would agree to in Singapore, it became increasingly clear there were forces at work in both capitals that had a strong interest in failure.

另外一些难题导致谈判根本无法推进到讨论这些问题的阶段。两国领导人揣测着新加坡会晤可以在什么样的长期目标上达成共识，与此同时有一点越来越明显，那就是两国国内强烈希望谈判失败的力量正在发挥作用。

The creators of North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces are the country’s true elite, celebrated as the heroes who keep America at bay. To lose their arsenal is to lose their status and influence.

朝鲜核武器和导弹部队的创建者是该国真正的权贵，他们被认为是让美国不敢轻举妄动的英雄。对他们来说，失去武器库就失去了地位和影响力。

When Mr. Trump sent one of his deputy national security advisers to Singapore a week ago for a prearranged meeting to work out summit logistics, the North Koreans stood him up. In the past week, they did not answer the phone, a senior administration official told reporters Thursday afternoon.

一周前，特朗普按照约定派出了一位副国家安全顾问前往新加坡，打算就峰会的细节与朝鲜展开洽谈，但朝鲜并未赴约。周四下午，一位高级政府官员告诉记者，在过去的一周里，朝鲜人都没有接听电话。

The North has its own list of complaints. After Mr. Trump accepted Mr. Kim’s offer to meet face-to-face, he replaced his national security adviser with John R. Bolton, who just a few months ago published an essay entitled “The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First,’’ an ode to pre-empting Pyongyang — no matter what it promised about the future.

朝鲜也有自己的一系列不满。在接受了金正恩面对面会晤的提议之后，特朗普便让几个月前才发表《从法律角度谈率先打击朝鲜的理由》(The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First)一文的约翰·R·博尔顿(John R. Bolton)接任国家安全顾问。文章鼓吹对平壤采取先发制人的策略——不论它对未来有何承诺。

Once he ensconced himself in the West Wing, Mr. Bolton began talking publicly about the “the Libyan model’’ of turning over nuclear weapons, a reference to a deal he helped design in 2003 in which Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi turned over a nascent nuclear program in return for exactly the kinds of economic lures Mr. Trump was talking about.

进驻白宫西翼后，博尔顿便开始公开谈论有关交出核武器的“利比亚模式”，这指的是他在2003年帮助设计的一项协议。根据协议，穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲上校(Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi)为换取经济诱饵交出了刚刚建起的核项目。而这种经济诱饵和特朗普口中的那种如出一辙。

To the North Koreans, Mr. Bolton knew, the Libya example was shorthand for making a bad decision to unilaterally disarm. They have little doubt that if North Korean citizens rose to overthrow their government — as Libyan rebels did against Colonel Qaddafi in 2011 — Washington would be more than happy to help chase down the leadership.

博尔顿知道，对朝鲜来说，利比亚的例子就代表着同意单边解除武装是一个错误决定。他们毫不怀疑，如果朝鲜公民像利比亚的叛乱者在2011年反抗卡扎菲上校时那样站起来推翻政府，华盛顿将非常乐意帮他们追击朝鲜领导层。

None of this means the initiatives with North Korea are entirely dead. Mr. Trump carefully left open the door for Mr. Kim to “call me or write” if he decides to cease the threats of nuclear exchanges and wants to reschedule the summit.

这一切都不意味着朝鲜完全丧失了主动权。特朗普谨慎地为金正恩留了道门，让他在决定停止核战争威胁、想要重新安排会晤时，可以“给我打电话或写信”。

But Mr. Trump also on Thursday could not resist echoing his tweet months ago about the size of the nuclear button on his desk: America’s nuclear capabilities “are so massive and powerful” that he should never be tempted to reach for them.

但在周四，特朗普还是忍不住重申了自己数月之前发表的、有关他办公桌上核按钮大小的推文：美国的核能力“是如此庞大而有力”，别引诱他出手。

It may have been intended to intimidate. But it seems more likely to spur Mr. Kim to new demonstrations of his own capabilities to reach American cities with North Korean missiles.

这可能是为了恐吓，但似乎更有可能是刺激金正恩做出新的示威，以表现他有能力用导弹打击美国城市。

In fact, the question about North Korea now is the same question that Washington is asking about Iran: What is their next chess move? Are they likely to escalate?

事实上，现在关于朝鲜的问题，与华盛顿在伊朗问题上的思考是一样的：他们的下一步棋是什么?有恶化的可能吗?

For now, the Iranians have indicated they are taking it slow. But history suggests that North Korea’s reaction to the end of negotiations is almost always to create a crisis — and see if that, in turn, forces the United States back to the table.

目前，伊朗已表现出正在缓慢行事。但历史表明，朝鲜在谈判结束时的反应几乎总是要制造危机——并要看看这反过来能否让美国重回谈判桌。

When the “Agreed Framework” with the Clinton administration collapsed — in part because of North Korean cheating, in part because of the United States’ lack of interest in moving toward reconciliation — Mr. Kim’s father moved to the country’s first nuclear tests.

朝鲜与克林顿政府的“框架协议”部分因朝鲜的欺骗、部分因美国缺乏和解的兴趣而崩溃。之后，金正恩的父亲便带领朝鲜进行了第一次核试验。

When accords were scuttled at the end of the Bush administration, the North tested a new president, Barack Obama, with a series of larger nuclear tests and then a race to build intercontinental missiles.

在布什政府末期，和平条约的希望已经破灭。新总统贝拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)面临的考验，是朝鲜一系列更大规模的核试验，以及加紧制造洲际导弹。

Even before he came to office, Mr. Trump complained — accurately — that the incremental approaches pursued by his predecessors had failed.

就连特朗普都在上任之前明确批评过他的先任者们失败的渐进式做法。

He inherited a North Korea that had exploited America’s distraction during Iraq, Afghanistan and the Iran negotiations, and managed to build 20 to 60 nuclear weapons. The North had paid almost no price. So Mr. Trump did what he learned to do in the New York real estate market: Make maximalist demands, inflict pain and then begin a negotiation.

他接手时，朝鲜已经利用了美国在伊拉克、阿富汗和伊朗谈判期间的分心，造出了20到60件核武器，几乎没有付出任何代价。于是，特朗普用起了他在纽约房地产市场里学来的那一套：提出最大要求，制造痛苦，再开始谈判。

But his “fire and fury’’ approach resulted in reactions he had never seen in the private market. Mr. Moon became so concerned that a new, famously volatile American president could trip into a war on the Korean Peninsula, that he raced to wrap Mr. Trump into a negotiation that would make it difficult for the United States to launch the kind of pre-emptive attack Mr. Bolton had advocated.

不过，他声称的“炮火与怒火”导致私营市场产生了他从未见过的反应。文在寅特别担心，这位以喜怒无常著称的新总统会在朝鲜半岛上点燃战火，所以，他急忙将特朗普拉入了谈判，这样一来美国很难发起博尔顿主张的先制打击。

Mr. Moon then showered Mr. Trump with effusive praise, even to the point of endorsing the premature talk about Nobel Peace Prizes.

随后，文在寅对特朗普进行了过于热情的赞美，甚至早早地提出了支持特朗普获诺贝尔和平奖的想法。

“Moon’s role is what is entirely new this time,’’ Mr. Perry noted, hours before the summit planning fell apart. The South Korean president saw himself as the essential go-between, the central player in coaxing both sides back on track when moments of crisis — like this one — arise.

“这一次，文在寅的作用是全新的，”佩里在峰会计划流产前数小时表示。这位韩国总统认为自己是关键的中间人，是在危机出现时劝说双方回到正轨的中心角色，比如这一次的危机。

Now comes the test of his peacemaking skills.

现在，考验他和平缔造能力的时刻到了。

“The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and building a permanent peace on the peninsula is a task we cannot give up or delay,” Mr. Moon said in Seoul on Thursday, calling the cancellation of the summit “disconcerting and very regrettable.” He urged Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim to talk directly.

“朝鲜半岛的无核化和永久和平是我们不能放弃或推迟的任务，”文在寅周四在首尔表示。他还表示，取消峰会“令人不安，非常遗憾”。他敦促特朗普和金正恩直接对话。

Mr. Moon’s task is to rebuild what fell apart. But first there must be a diagnosis of what went wrong.

文在寅的任务是弥合分裂。但首先要诊断哪里出了问题。

Overheated rhetoric on both sides — including unsubtle reminders of each nation’s willingness to wipe the other off the map — was part of it. But that was an occasional feature of the Cold War, too.

一个问题是双方的言辞过于激烈，包括将对方从地图上抹去的露骨提醒。但冷战期间有时也会出现这种情况。

The bigger problem was that the United States and North Korea were never on the same page about what the objective of the negotiation should be. Mr. Trump, Mr. Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had one vision: What they called “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization.”

更大的问题在于美朝从未在谈判目标上达成一致。特朗普、博尔顿和美国国务卿迈克·庞皮欧(Mike Pompeo)有一个愿景：他们称之为“完全的、可核实的、不可逆转的无核化”。

But it was a one-sided affair — never once did they raise the likelihood that the United States would have to give something up, too.

但这个想法是单方面的，他们从来没提到过美国也必须放弃某些东西的可能性。

Mr. Kim used the phrase “denuclearization” as well, but he seemed to be discussing something more like arms control. He was willing to give up part of the arsenal, but only as the United States pulled back its troops in South Korea and gradually surrendered its ability to threaten the North.

金正恩也用过“无核化”这个词，但他说的似乎更像是军备控制。他愿意放弃部分军火库，但前提是美国撤回驻韩军队，逐步放弃威胁朝鲜的能力。

Mr. Trump, of course, talked about the North giving up all of its weapons in one fell swoop — before allowing, just in the past few days, that he might be willing to try a more gradual approach.

当然，特朗普一直以来说的是朝鲜一下子放弃所有的武器，只在过去几天才表示可能愿意尝试更渐进的方式。

But that was probably too late.

但那可能已经太迟了。

“Zero warheads was never going to be on the table,’’ said Robert S. Litwak, senior vice president of the Wilson Center for International Scholars, who wrote a detailed study of how to deal, gradually, with defanging the North Korean threat. He said Mr. Trump needs to move to something closer to the 2015 Iranian deal, which constrained but did not eliminate Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.

“零核弹头永远不会出现在谈判桌上，”威尔逊国际学者中心(Wilson Center for International studies)的高级副主席罗伯特·S·利特瓦克(Robert S. Litwak)说。他写过一篇详细的研究报告，讨论如何逐步解除朝鲜的威胁。他表示，特朗普需要采取更接近2015年伊朗协议的方式，该协议限制了伊朗的核能力，但没有将其彻底消除。

That, of course, is the deal Mr. Trump just walked away from a few weeks ago, meaning that he now has two nuclear crises on his hands at once.

当然，它就是几周前刚刚被特朗普放弃的协议，这意味着他现在同时面临两个核危机。