FT社评：理性应对特朗普的非理性钢铝关税

The world’s big steel and aluminium-exporting countries are grappling with one of the more intractable puzzles in trade policy: how do you deal with a fundamentally illogical hegemon?

全球钢铁和铝出口大国正在努力应对贸易政策中更棘手的难题之一：如何与一个根本不按常理出牌的霸权国打交道?

Donald Trump’s announcement of emergency tariffs on steel and aluminium has put the likes of the EU, Japan, Canada, Mexico and Brazil into a quandary. The duties will come in next week, and in the meantime the EU and others are formulating their reaction.

唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)对钢铁和铝宣布征收紧急关税，令欧盟、日本、加拿大、墨西哥和巴西等经济体陷入了左右为难的窘境。这些关税将于下周生效，同时，欧盟和其他经济体正在制定应对措施。

Their responses so far have largely been drawn from the traditional playbook: attempt to negotiate exclusions from the tariffs (successfully, so far, for Canada, Mexico and Australia) or hit back with tariffs of their own in politically sensitive areas (the EU’s current plans). But the risks of these moves going legally astray or setting off a major trade war are much higher than in earlier decades. Affected countries should be planning (as well or instead) to keep the trading system open and functioning between themselves.

到目前为止，他们的反应还是以传统方式为主：尝试协商关税豁免(目前加拿大、墨西哥和澳大利亚成功了)，或者通过在政治敏感领域也征收关税进行回击(欧盟目前的计划)。但这些措施在法律上陷入误区或者引发大规模贸易战的风险要比在此前的几十年高得多。受影响的国家应该转而或同时做出计划，以保持当前贸易体系在它们自己之间的开放和正常运行。

The standard answer to a provocation like Mr Trump’s would be to take a case to the World Trade Organization and in the meantime contemplate countermeasures. But Mr Trump’s decision to invoke the rarely used national security exemption in WTO rules has complicated this.

针对特朗普这类挑衅的标准解决方式是向世界贸易组织(WTO)提起诉讼，同时考虑反制措施。但特朗普决定援引WTO规则中极少被使用的国家安全豁免条款，让情况变得更加复杂。

The irrationality and inconsistency is plain to see. The US’s main national security adversary, China, is barely affected by the tariffs. Mr Trump himself frequently departs from the script by arguing that the tariffs are actually intended to correct unfair trade.

其中的不合理和相互矛盾之处显而易见。美国的主要国家安全对手是中国，而后者几乎没有受到钢铝关税的影响。特朗普本人经常不按剧本演戏，辩称这些关税实际上是为了纠正不公平贸易。

But the obvious nonsense of the justification does not necessarily ensure trading partners will win a WTO case — or indeed permit the EU, as Brussels has threatened, to classify the tariffs as “safeguards” designed to cope with surges in imports and impose countermeasures unilaterally. WTO rules give wide discretion to governments to invoke national security exemptions.

但其明显胡说八道的理由并不一定能保证贸易伙伴赢得WTO诉讼——或者允许欧盟像布鲁塞尔威胁的那样将这些关税列为旨在应对进口激增并单方面实施反制措施的“保护措施”。WTO规则赋予各国政府广泛的自由裁量权来援引国家安全豁免条款。

It is quite possible that, assuming the cases can wend their way through a clogged-up WTO dispute settlement system, the US would win and the EU lose. This would hand Mr Trump a propaganda victory.

即使这些案件真的得以通过运行不畅的WTO争端解决机制解决，结果也很可能是美国会赢，欧盟会输。这将送给特朗普一次宣传上的胜利。

In addition to retaliation or as an alternative option, the global economy’s big powers need to consider how they can keep the system going without the US. Cutting tariffs or otherwise easing trade between themselves as much as possible within WTO rules would be a way of showing the US that its exports could be disadvantaged by its actions.

除了报复之外，作为替代方案，全球几大经济体还需要考虑如何在没有美国的情况下维持贸易体系运转。在WTO规则内尽量削减关税，或放宽彼此的贸易限制，将是向美国展示其出口可能因其行为而处于不利地位的方法之一。

The commendable efforts of the other 11 economies in the Trans-Pacific Partnership to resurrect the talks after Mr Trump had pulled out of the deal shows the way. More broadly, with regard to the health of the multilateral trading system, other countries have been pondering the possibility of setting up their own dispute settlement system under the aegis of WTO rules.

《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership，简称TPP)余下11个经济体在特朗普退出后重启谈判的可贵努力就是榜样。在更广泛的层面上，关于多边贸易体系的健康问题，其他国家一直在思考在WTO规则的庇护下建立自己的争端解决机制的可能性。

None of this is easy, not least because any effective effort to isolate the US in the system will need to include China, which has been shifting away from an open, rules-based approach to trade. But trying to bargain for exemptions from a notoriously fickle negotiator, or tackling the US head-on with potentially illegal sanctions, are fraught with more than the usual danger.

这些都不容易，尤其是任何在该体系内孤立美国的有效努力都需要中国的加入，而中国正逐渐远离开放的、基于规则的贸易方式。但试图与一个以多变著称的谈判对手协商豁免，或以可能不合法的制裁与美国正面对抗，则充满不同寻常的危险。

The EU and other big economies need to err on the side of caution. The US steel tariffs, after all, will affect only about 2 per cent of EU steel production: not negligible, but not dramatic. The slow, painstaking business of pursuing legal avenues and building a system that bypasses the US is much less satisfying than slapping tariffs on bourbon. But it may well pay longer-term dividends in the face of such a mercurial US administration.

欧盟和其他大型经济体需要谨慎行事。毕竟，美国的钢铁关税只会影响欧盟钢铁产量的约2%，不容忽视，但并不严重。追求以法律途径解决和建立一个绕过美国的体系是一项缓慢而艰苦的工作，远不如对冥顽不灵者加征关税来得痛快。但面对如此反复无常的美国政府，这项工作可能会带来更长期的回报。