意大利选民已从挺欧变为疑欧

The election results in Italy are a lesson to Europe. Italians were once among the most enthusiastic supporters of the European project. This is true no longer. The combination of economic malaise with political impotence has discredited not only Italy’s political and policymaking elite, but even the country’s engagement with the EU.

意大利的大选结果给欧洲上了一课。意大利人曾经是欧洲一体化最热情的支持者群体之一。如今已不再是这样。经济低迷加上政治无能，不仅使得意大利政治和决策精英名誉扫地，甚至还危及了该国与欧盟的关系。

This does not mean Italy will leave; the costs would be too great. It means instead that the threat of both friction between Italy and the European establishment and further financial and economic disruption is now far greater.

这并不意味着意大利会退欧;退出的成本太高了。但这意味着如今两个大得多的威胁：一是意大利与欧洲建制派之间的摩擦，二是进一步的金融和经济动荡。

The election results are quite as shocking as the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Tump in the US: 55 per cent of the voters chose Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties.

意大利大选结果令人震惊的程度与英国退欧公投和唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)当选美国总统相仿：55%的选民选择了持欧洲怀疑论和反体制的政党。

The Five Star Movement — an amorphous party of protest — gained 32 per cent of the vote and the League — a rightwing nationalist party — gained 18 per cent. The share of the centre-left Democratic party, in which the European establishment had put its trust, tumbled from 41 per cent four years ago to 19 per cent. The share of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia fell to 14 per cent. The populist revolution devours its parent.

无组织的抗议派政党五星运动(Five Star Movement)赢得了32%的选票，而右翼民族主义政党联盟党(League Party)赢得了18%的选票。承载着欧洲建制派信任的中左翼政党民主党(Democratic Party)的得票率从4年前的41%骤降至19%。西尔维奥•贝卢斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)的意大利力量党(Forza Italia)的支持率降至14%。在这场民粹主义革命中，青出于蓝而胜于蓝。

Why are Italian voters so disenchanted? The obvious answers are that economic performance has been so dismal, while established Italian policymakers appear so ineffective. This is certainly not only — probably not even mainly — due to Italy’s participation in the euro. But the eurozone has made things worse. Not least, it offers an external scapegoat, which unscrupulous politicians are happy to exploit. Blaming foreigners is always an attractive strategy. In a failing country with a frustrated population, it is irresistible.

意大利选民为何如此心灰意冷?显而易见的答案是，近年经济表现如此惨淡，而体制内的意大利政策制定者显得如此无能。这肯定不仅仅是因为(甚至可以说主要不是因为)意大利加入欧洲单一货币。但欧元区确实使得情况更糟。尤其是，它提供了一个外部的替罪羊，而无底线的政客乐于利用这一点。责怪外国人永远是具有吸引力的战略。在一个民众沮丧的正在走下坡路的国家，责怪外国人简直是不可抗拒的冲动。

One aspect of the eurozone has been the inadequacy of its overall macroeconomic policy. In January 2018, the consumer price index of the eurozone (excluding erratic items) was 7.2 per cent lower than it would have been had it risen at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent since January 2007 — a rate of inflation that is a reasonable interpretation of the European Central Bank’s objective of “inflation rates below, but close to, 2 per cent over the medium term”.

欧元区的一个方面是缺乏整体的宏观经济政策。2018年1月，欧元区核心消费价格指数(CPI，剔除了不稳定项目)相比自2007年1月以来每年上涨1.9%(这个通胀率是对欧洲央行“通胀率在中期低于但接近2%”这个目标的合理解读)将会达到的水平低了7.2%。

An alternative assessment of macroeconomic policy is in terms of the growth of nominal gross domestic product. By the third quarter of 2017, eurozone nominal GDP was 11 per cent lower than it would have been had it grown at an annual rate of 3 per cent since early 2007 — a rate that would have been consistent with annual real growth of around 1 per cent and inflation of 2 per cent. Under Mario Draghi, the ECB did act successfully in the end. Yet overall macroeconomic policy has clearly been inadequate. It failed to deliver adequate growth in overall aggregate demand (see charts).

对宏观经济政策的另一种评估方法是看名义GDP增长。截至2017年第三季度，欧元区名义GDP相比自2007年初以来每年增长3%(这个增速将与实际GDP约1%的年度增长和2%的年通胀率一致)将会达到的水平低了11%。在马里奥•德拉吉(Mario Draghi)的领导下，欧洲央行最终确实成功地采取行动。然而整体宏观经济政策明显不足。它未能带来整体总需求的足够增长(见图表)。

Within this weak macroeconomic environment, huge divergences also opened up among individual member countries. Germany’s nominal GDP rose by 34 per cent between the first quarter of 2007 and the last quarter of 2017 (a compound average annual rate of 2.7 per cent). Italy’s rose by a mere 9 per cent over the same period (a compound average annual rate of 0.8 per cent).

在这个疲弱的宏观经济环境内部，成员国之间也形成了巨大差异。从2007年第一季度到2017年第四季度，德国名义GDP增长了34%(平均年复合增长率为2.7%)。同期意大利名义GDP仅增长9%(平均年复合增长率为0.8%)。

Not surprisingly, given modest overall growth of nominal GDP, even Germany’s core annual inflation averaged a little over 1 per cent. Such low inflation in the core creditor country made adjustments in competitiveness within the eurozone far more difficult. 并不令人意外的是，鉴于名义GDP整体增长有限，就连德国的平均年核心通胀率也只是略高于1%。核心债权国通胀率如此之低，使得欧元区内部的竞争力调整更加困难。

If the Italian government had been able to pursue its traditional policy of devaluation and inflation, it could have generated a far stronger rise in nominal GDP. That would surely also have delivered higher levels of real output. Italy’s real GDP in the last quarter of 2017 was, instead, 5 per cent below its level in the first quarter of 2007, while its real GDP per head was still some 9 per cent below the 2007 level a full decade later. No wonder Italians are disillusioned.

如果意大利政府可以实行货币贬值和通胀的传统政策，它本可以实现名义GDP的更强劲增长。那肯定也会带来更高的实际产出增长。相反，2017年第四季度意大利实际GDP比2007年第一季度的水平低了5%，而2017年人均实际GDP比2007年水平低了大约9%。难怪意大利人幻想破灭。

No doubt, Italy has huge structural economic problems, which tightly constrain growth, but potential output cannot have fallen this much since 2007. Italy also suffers from chronically deficient demand, a failing that the eurozone, as it is now run, is simply unable to remedy. This is partly because overall demand has been too weak and partly because, within the rules, demand cannot be directed to where it is weakest.

毫无疑问，意大利存在巨大的结构性经济问题，严重制约着经济增长，但自2007年以来潜在产出不可能下滑这么多。意大利还面临需求长期不振的问题;按照目前运行方式，欧元区根本无法解决该问题。部分原因是整体需求太疲弱，还有部分原因是在目前规则下需求无法被导向最疲软的地方。

A prolonged recession, with high unemployment and low employment has inescapable political consequences. But the biggest frustration may be that the people Italians vote for have next to no room for manoeuvre. The question has rather been whom to elect (or sometimes not even elect) to carry out the policies decided in Brussels and Berlin. 长期衰退、外加失业率高企和就业率偏低，必然会带来政治后果。但是最令人沮丧的事情也许是意大利人民选出的领导人几乎没有回旋余地。迄今的问题是，选举谁(有时甚至不用选)来执行由布鲁塞尔和柏林方面决定的政策。

Why not vote for a clown or a party created by a clown? It might not make much difference to what happens in Italy, but it might at least be more amusing.

何不选一个小丑或由一个小丑创建的政党?这样做也许不会怎么改变意大利的现实，但至少有可能更好玩。

Some Italian economists now argue that the country could obtain a degree of macroeconomic policy freedom by issuing what is known as “fiscal money” — a parallel currency that could be used to pay Italian taxes.

一些意大利经济学家现在提出，通过发行所谓的“财政货币”(可以用来在意大利交税的平行货币)，意大利可以获得一定程度的宏观经济政策自由。

This is technically possible. It would surely create hysteria in northern Europe, since it would eliminate the monetary policy monopoly of the ECB. But the very fact that such a radical idea is being discussed demonstrates the scale of the disenchantment in so large and important a country.

这在技术上是可行的。此举必然会造成北部欧洲歇斯底里的反应，因为它意味着欧洲央行丧失对货币政策的专断权。但是讨论如此激进的想法本身表明了这个重要大国的人们心灰意冷的程度。

Unless and until the eurozone is able to generate widely-shared prosperity, it remains vulnerable to political upheaval. Weaknesses of the system, plus the impotence of democratic politics at the only level that really counts (the national one) remains a recipe for populism and fragility.

除非——以及直到——欧元区能够营造广泛共享的繁荣，否则它仍然容易受到政治动荡的影响。体制的弱点、外加民主政治在国家这个真正重要的层面上无能，仍然是民粹主义和脆弱性的根源。

Italy, as many remark, is too big to fail and too big to bail. But its voters have moved from europhilia to scepticism. Like it or not, the risks of further upheaval are big.

正如很多人所说的那样，意大利一方面太大而不能倒下，另一方面太大而无法纾困。但该国选民对欧元区的态度已经从支持变为怀疑。无论人们喜欢与否，意大利发生进一步动荡的风险很大。