欧洲该如何应对中国经济崛起？
The EU needs to rebalance its economic relations with China, where there is currently a flagrant lack of reciprocity. While China maintains a largely open market for goods, it is less open for services and even less for investment. 欧盟需要重新调整自己与中国的经济关系，这一关系目前明目张胆地缺乏互惠。尽管中国基本上保持对商品开放的市场，但它对服务业不那么开放，对投资更是如此。
Now, China certainly does not flout the rules of the World Trade Organization. But its defence of the status quo at the WTO is unacceptable to Europe since the rules that prevailed when Beijing joined in late 2001 no longer hold. 应该承认，中国没有公然违反世界贸易组织(WTO)规则。但是，中国对于其在世贸组织的现状的捍卫是欧洲无法接受的，因为北京方面在2001年底加入WTO时实行的规则已不再适用。
This is why the EU is pushing for a form of offensive multilateralism that will enable it to benefit from its comparative advantages and, above all, take the initiative on a whole range of questions with which the WTO is not best suited to deal. These include state subsidies, the financial opacity of state-owned enterprises and obstacles to foreign investment. 这就是为什么欧盟正在推动某种形式的进攻型多边主义，使其能够获益于自己的比较优势，最重要的是在WTO不适合处理的一系列问题上抓住主动。这些问题包括国家补贴、国有企业财务状况的不透明以及外国投资障碍。
Paradoxically, European grievances with China chime perfectly with those of the US. But the approach to tackling the challenge posed by Beijing is very different on either side of the Atlantic. The Europeans favour more rules, in what might called a “WTO-plus” framework. By contrast, and notwithstanding the emollient tone on global trade struck by Mr Trump at Davos last week, the US administration is prioritising bilateral deals. The EU wants more rules, Mr Trump more outcomes. 矛盾的是，欧洲对中国的不满与美国对中国的不满完全吻合。但是，大西洋两岸对付北京所构成的挑战的方式非常不同。欧洲人倾向于出台更多规则，即所谓的“WTO+”框架。与此形成反差的是，尽管特朗普上周在达沃斯对全球贸易的论调有所缓和，但美国行政当局优先考虑的是双边协定。欧盟希望制定更多规则，而特朗普想要更多成果。
There is a risk, therefore, that Europe will find itself squeezed between a US that rejects multilateralism and a China that favours the status quo. To offset this threat, EU member states must seek to harmonise their positions with the European Commission if they are to have any leverage with the Chinese. That was the logic of French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Beijing earlier this month. 因此，风险在于，欧洲发现自己被夹在拒绝多边主义的美国和倾向于维持现状的中国之间。为了化解这种威胁，如果欧盟成员国想要对中国有任何影响力的话，它们必须与欧盟委员会(European Commission)协调立场。这就是法国总统埃马纽埃尔•马克龙(Emmanuel Macron)上月访华的逻辑。
The dangers Europe faces are especially clear in relation to strategic investment, where the EU runs the risk of seeing its technology stolen by China if it does not establish pan-European legislation. The good news is that Germany is ready to abandon its attachment to free trade dogma and side with France on the necessity of preventing any form of Chinese control of strategic European assets. Here too the interplay between national governments and Brussels is crucial. 在战略投资方面，欧洲面临的危险格外明显——如果欧盟不建立泛欧洲法规，它可能会眼看着中国剽窃其技术。好消息是德国已经准备放弃对自由贸易信条的执念，转而接受法国的立场，即有必要阻止中资以任何形式控制欧洲的战略资产。在这方面，各国政府和布鲁塞尔之间的相互合作也至关重要。
The other challenge is to avoid countries, principally China, reaching infrastructure agreements with single European nations, notably those in central and eastern Europe. These could and would breach European procurement rules, and threaten the continent’s businesses. The EU needs to push Beijing to become part of the WTO’s plurilateral agreement on government procurement. 另一项挑战是避免某些国家(主要是中国)与个别欧洲国家(特别是中、东欧的那些国家)达成基础设施协议。这些协议可能(而且会)违反欧洲的采购规则，威胁到欧洲的企业。欧盟需要推动北京方面加入WTO的政府采购诸边协议。
Last, there is the challenge of protection where taxing multinationals is concerned. Here the EU is pitted against the US. The tax revenues of European states must be protected against widespread worldwide tax optimisation (the search by companies for jurisdictions that provide the lowest possible level of taxation). 最后，就向跨国企业征税而言，还有保护的挑战。在这方面，欧盟与美国处于竞争关系。欧洲国家的税收收入必须得到保护，以免受到普遍的全球税收优化的影响(即企业寻找那些提供最低可能的税收水平的司法管辖区)。
In this case, the responsibility is Europe’s: when one takes into account that four European states shelter half of the optimised tax receipts in the world. Europe cannot seriously claim to be defending a rules-based system when four of its states knowingly participate in global fiscal deregulation. 在这种情况下，责任在于欧洲：考虑到4个欧洲国家庇护了世界上一半的优化税收收入。当欧洲有4个国家在知情的情况下参与全球财政去监管时，欧洲无法宣称自己在捍卫基于规则的制度。
S 因此，在该议程上，无论对内还是对外，欧盟都能面对全球竞争并重拾其亟需的东西：欧盟公民感受到欧盟在当今的狂野世界中保护他们。
o it is on this agenda, both internal and external, that the EU can face global competition and regain that which it needs most: the sentiment of its citizens that it is protecting them in this wild world. 本文作者为巴黎政治大学(Sciences Po)教授，曾为法国前总理曼努埃尔•瓦尔斯(Manuel Valls)担任政治顾问
The writer is a professor at Sciences Po and served as a political adviser to former French prime minister Manuel Valls 译者/马柯斯
