从“三十六计”，看中美博弈

The US decision to label China a “strategic competitor” confirms what could no longer be concealed: the world’s two most powerful countries are locked in a fervent rivalry. The question now is how damaging the tussle may become both for the two adversaries and the rest of the world.

美国把中国列为“战略对手”(strategic competitor)的决定证实了不再被隐藏的事情：世界上最强大的两个国家正处于激烈的竞争当中。现在的问题是，这场竞争可能对这两个对手和世界其他国家造成多大的破坏?

Some see the contest inevitably bearing out the deadly prophesies of the “trap” first identified by ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who described how the rise of Athens instilled a fear into Sparta that made war unavoidable. The past five centuries have seen 16 cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one and in 12 of these cases the result was war, says Harvard professor Graham Allison.

有些人认为，这场竞争不可避免地将印证最早由古希腊历史学家修昔底德(Thucydides)提出的“陷阱”的致命预言——修昔底德描述了雅典的崛起是如何让斯巴达深陷恐惧当中从而使战争不可避免地发生的。美国哈佛大学教授格雷厄姆•阿利森(Graham Allison)表示，在过去500年里，有16个关于新崛起的强国威胁取代当时占统领地位的老牌强国的案例，其中12例以战争告终。

But a deeper view of China’s power accretion reveals strategies that are often more oblique than confrontational. Some of them appear faithful to the guileful lineage of the Chinese “36 stratagems”, a list of political, diplomatic and military tactics that date from around the same time that Thucydides was chronicling the Peloponnesian war in the fifth century BC.

但对中国实力增长的更深层次的观察显示，中国更倾向于采取迂回的、而非对抗性的策略。一些策略似乎暗合“三十六计”。中国的“三十六计”描述了一系列政治、外交和军事策略，差不多出现于公元前5世纪修昔底德记录伯罗奔尼撒战争的同一时期。

Several of the stratagems emphasise the value in avoiding direct challenges to a stronger competitor while seeking to undermine it through “proximate strategies”, the best known of which is “replacing their beams with rotten timbers”. This describes disrupting an adversary’s structure by changing the rules they are used to following. The aim was to achieve victory while avoiding the seemingly inevitable war.

其中一些计策强调有必要避免直接挑战比自己强大的竞争对手，同时寻求通过一套“并战计”来削弱竞争对手，其中最著名的一计是“偷梁换柱”。这种策略描述了通过改变对手习惯遵守的规则来破坏他们的架构。目的是为了取得胜利，同时避免看似不可避免的战争。

Today too, China often appears keen to move alongside the US rather than take it on and build power structures that stand as alternatives to those that uphold the western-led global order.

今天同样如此。中国往往表现得热衷于与美国并肩前行，而不是与它斗并打造新的权力体系来取代支撑西方主导的全球秩序的权力体系。

“Right now I would describe the modus vivendi that the world has found as being parallel play,” said Lawrence Summers, the former US Treasury secretary, in a speech in November. “The west does its thing; China does its thing. Countries get a bunch of money from China and they do it China’s way. Countries get a bunch of money from us and they do it our way.”

美国前财长劳伦斯•萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)今年11月在一场演讲中表示：“当前，我会把世界暂时达成的妥协局面形容为并行游戏。西方做它自己的事情，中国做它自己的事情。有的国家从中国那里得到一大笔钱，它们按照中国的方式做事。有的国家从我们这里得到一大笔钱，他们按照我们的方式做事。”

His concern was not war, but how long the beams that have held up the structure of global governance under Pax Americana may endure. While “everybody is very polite to everybody else” and all parties can still move forward together, he says the challenge remains: what is the system of global governance in which the US and the west and China are all going to participate in?

他担心的不是战争，而是在“美国治下的和平”(Pax Americana)下支撑全球治理架构的“梁”还能持续多久。尽管“人人都对他人礼貌相待”，各方仍然可以共同前进，但他表示，挑战依然存在：美国和西方以及中国都将参与的全球治理体系是什么样子的?

Meanwhile, evidence of China’s parallel play is growing. The Belt and Road initiative (BRI), through which China intends to boost commerce with about 70 countries between Asia and Europe, puts Beijing in the driving seat of a new type of multilateralism. Run by a Communist party “leading group”, the BRI diverges from the US playbook in that it does not seek to negotiate a free trade treaty with member countries but promises a series of infrastructure projects financed and built by Beijing.

与此同时，不断有证据显示中国推行平行策略。中国“一带一路”(BRI)倡议旨在促进中国与约70个亚欧国家的贸易，它让北京处于新型多边主义的主导地位。由一个共产党的“领导小组”运营的“一带一路”与美国的游戏规则背道而驰，因为中国不谋求与成员国谈判自由贸易条约，而是承诺由中国出资建设一系列基础设施项目。

The BRI stands as a partial parallel structure to the World Trade Organization, within which China — in spite of its strongest objections — is not regarded as a “market economy”, putting Beijing at a disadvantage when it fights trade dumping cases levelled against it.

“一带一路”在结构上与世界贸易组织(WTO)部分平行。中国在世贸组织内没有被视为“市场经济”国家(尽管中国对此表示强烈反对)，这让北京在应对针对它的贸易倾销案件时处于劣势。

The ill will felt by Beijing over its status within the WTO may deepen following a decision this month by the US, EU and Japan to form an alliance to take on China over allegations that it unfairly subsidises its industries, forces foreign companies to transfer technology and engages in other unfair practices.

关于中国在世贸组织内部的地位，北京方面将感受到更深的敌意，因为美国、欧盟和日本本月决定组建联盟，共同指控中国对其产业提供不公平补贴、迫使外国公司转让技术，以及其他不公平做法。

“If the narrative since 1978 was of China’s slow integration to the international order and adoption of norms, it is turning now towards a systemic clash,” note François Godement and Abigaël Vasselier of the European Council on Foreign Relations think-tank.

智库“欧洲对外交关系委员会”(European Council on Foreign Relations)的顾德明(François Godement)和阿比盖尔•瓦塞尔耶(Abigaël Vasselier)指出：“如果说1978年以来的叙事是中国慢慢融入国际秩序并遵守规则，那么现在的叙事正转向系统性的冲突。”

In Europe, a China-led group called 16+1 brings together 11 members of the EU and five non-EU central and eastern European countries into a political and commercial grouping. All 16 members are also BRI countries, and several have signed up to significant Chinese-financed infrastructure deals, boosting Beijing’s influence inside the EU.

在欧洲，一个以中国为首的“16+1合作”机制把11个欧盟成员国和5个非欧盟的中东欧国家汇集成一个政治和商业组织。这16个成员国全都加入了“一带一路”，其中几个国家签署了由中国提供资金的重大基础设施协议，提升了北京在欧盟内部的影响力。

Indeed, the country that Donald Trump identified along with Russia as “antithetical to US values and interests” bears the traits of a highly potent challenger.

确实，这个与俄罗斯一起被美国总统特朗普视为“与美国价值观和利益相悖”的国家，具有强大的挑战者的特征。

Contrary to longstanding arguments that China would collapse under the weight of its internal contradictions or become bogged down by huge domestic debts, Beijing’s authoritarian system is so far proving itself capable of nurturing world-class industries in e-commerce, big data, aspects of automation and some others.

与长期以来有关中国将会因内部矛盾而崩溃或者因巨额国内债务而陷入困境的说法相反，迄今的事实已经证明，北京的威权体制有能力在电子商务、大数据、自动化方面以及其他一些领域培育世界级产业。

If it sustains its rate of growth, China will eclipse the US as the world’s largest economy within the foreseeable future. A single-party state presiding over a non-market economy that is still “emerging” may then hold the whip hand in global commerce.

如果中国保持其经济增速，那么在可预见的未来，中国将超越美国成为世界第一大经济体。一个仍在“崛起”的一党制非市场经济国家接下来可能在全球贸易中处于支配地位。

The key issue then may not so much be how the world can avoid a “Thucydides trap” but how the west can repair the rotten timbers upon which its eviscerated governance structures rest.

那么关键问题可能很大程度上不在于世界如何避免“修昔底德陷阱”，而是西方如何修复其治理架构所依赖的已腐朽的柱子。