乐视“烂摊子”引债权人争抢

Felix Tao still remembers how thrilled he was to receive one of his biggest orders: a Rmb1.6m ($244,000) deal to supply phone parts to Le Mobile, the mobile phone subsidiary of tech conglomerate LeEco.

Felix Tao还记得自己接到乐视(LeEco)的订单时有多激动，这是他最大的订单之一：订单价值160万人民币(24.4万美元)，内容是为这家科技企业集团的手机公司乐视移动(Le Mobile)供应零部件。

Almost two years later, however, the young supplier from the coastal province of Shandong says he is still waiting to be paid. “LeEco keeps telling us to give them some time. We have heard that line so many times that we have it memorised,” he says.

然而，差不多两年后，这位来自沿海省份山东的年轻供应商说，他仍在等乐视付款。“乐视一直让我们再宽限他们一些时间。这套说辞我们已经听了太多次了，都会背了，”他说。

The unravelling of LeEco, the tech group that once aimed to be the Tesla and Netflix of China, has devolved into a chaotic scramble for cash, providing a case study case into the shakiness of the country’s nascent corporate bankruptcy regime.

乐视曾致力于成为中国的特斯拉(Tesla)与Netflix，它的坍塌引起债权人无序争抢该集团的现金，这成为研究中国新建立的企业破产制度根基不稳的一个案例。

This has sweeping implications for the country’s ability to allocate and manage debt. A dysfunctional bankruptcy system has allowed China’s insolvent businesses to continue with little pressure to restructure. It has also discouraged investors and banks from properly pricing credit risk into their lending, which spells trouble for a country with $18tn in corporate debt, equal to 169 per cent of gross domestic product, according to the Bank for International Settlements.

这件事对中国的债务处置能力有着深远含义。由于破产制度不健全，中国一些资不抵债的企业得以继续维持，而几乎没有重组的压力。它也阻碍投资者和银行在提供资金时恰当地对信贷风险进行定价，对于这个企业债务负担沉重的国家，这带来了一个问题。国际清算银行(Bank for International Settlements)的数据显示，中国企业债务总额为18万亿美元，相当于中国国内生产总值(GDP)的169%。

On paper, China’s corporate bankruptcy law, implemented in 2007, is nearly identical to regimes in the US and Europe. In practice, businesses typically shun bankruptcy in favour of the informal resolution channels they have used for decades.

理论上，中国自2007年开始实施的企业破产法与美国及欧洲的破产制度差别不大。可实际上，企业往往会回避破产，倾向于采取他们几十年来惯用的不正规的处置渠道。

“Near as I can tell, [the bankruptcy process] doesn’t really exist. It’s there on paper, and I vaguely recall hearing of a few cases, but for the most part it is ignored,” says Dan Harris, a lawyer who specialises in Chinese business law.

“据我所知，(破产程序)名存实亡，我隐约记得听说过一些破产案，但大多数情况下，破产程序被视而不见，”一名专攻中国商业法的律师丹•哈里斯(Dan Harris)表示。

Creditors can force a group into bankruptcy if they can demonstrate it is overdue on payments. But that can be difficult in China as creditors often do not have full access to the parent company’s financials.

如果债权人能够证明一家企业逾期付款，就可以迫使其破产。但在中国很难这么做，因为债权人往往无法完全知悉对方母公司的财务状况。

LeEco projected an image of business-as-usual despite reporting a Rmb637m loss in its listed business, Leshi, in the first half of 2017, amid signs the group was running out of cash. During this period, LeEco founder Jia Yueting travelled to Hong Kong to raise money for its electric car venture with US start-up Faraday Future.

乐视上市子公司乐视网(Leshi)公布2017年上半年亏损6.37亿人民币，集团显露出资金趋于枯竭的迹象，但乐视仍营造出一种正常运营的印象。当时乐视创始人贾跃亭还前往香港，为乐视与美国初创企业法拉第未来(Faraday Future)的电动汽车合资公司融资。

This month, China’s supreme court put Mr Jia on a blacklist for unpaid debts, and Beijing ordered him to return to China to answer questions about a Leshi debt.

本月，中国最高法院将贾跃亭列入失信黑名单，北京方面责令其返回中国就乐视网债务做出解释。

Alarmed by LeEco’s well-publicised financial woes, the company’s creditors took action earlier this year to seize LeEco’s remaining assets.

乐视财务困境被广泛报道后，惊慌失措的各路债权人今年早些时候纷纷采取行动，寻求扣押乐视剩余资产。

“Creditors feel they must move swiftly and aggressively to safeguard their interests in China,” says Shaun Wu, a Hong Kong lawyer who specialises in advising parties in China foreign joint venture disputes. “There is less of a willingness to stand in line and wait for everything to be sorted.”

“债权人认为，他们必须迅速积极地采取行动维护他们在中国的利益。”专门为陷入中外合资纠纷的客户提供服务的香港律师Shaun Wu说，“他们不太愿意排队等待所有事情都安排好。”

The upshot is that instead of a smooth restructuring, Chinese insolvency typically dissolves into a disorderly fight for the cash and assets of the indebted group. When LeEco’s cash problems became public about 10 lenders occupied the group’s office, looking for assurances from management they would be repaid.

其结果是，在中国，资不抵债企业往往不会进行平稳的重组，而是会出现无序争夺负债企业现金和资产的局面。在乐视的资金问题曝光之后，大约10家贷款机构占领了乐视的办公室，寻求从管理层那里得到它们将得到偿付的保证。

LeEco did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

乐视没有对多次的置评请求作出回应。

The likelihood of creditors getting their money back is further complicated by a quirk of Chinese financing: CEO share pledging.

债权人收回资金的可能性还因为一种古怪的中国融资方式进一步复杂化，即首席执行官股权质押。

Using personal shares to secure loans is common in China, where 10 per cent of the value of the mainland stock market (by value) is pledged against loans, according to Bank of America.

使用个人所持股份来获得贷款的做法在中国很普遍，据美国银行(Bank of America)的数据，价值约占中国内地股市总市值10%的股票被用于质押贷款。

The founder will often use the cash to lend to the company, and the company’s finances will quickly overlap with that of the founder. However, because China does not let individuals declare bankruptcy, the backers of insolvent groups are highly motivated to steer their companies away from such proceedings.

创始人通常把质押所得资金借给企业，企业的财务状况很快与创始人的财务状况重叠。然而，由于中国不允许个人宣布破产，资不抵债企业的出资者有很强的动机不让他们的企业走破产程序。

“A private company may be approaching bankruptcy because the individual debt of the chairman is so high, but that personal debt cannot be forgiven,” says Han Chuanhua, a Beijing-based bankruptcy lawyer. “In that case, an individual would want to avoid bankruptcy at all costs.” “一家私人企业可能会因为董事长个人的高负债而临近破产，但个人债务是无法被免除的。”北京的破产律师Han Chuanhua说，“在这种情况下，个人会千方百计避免破产。”

Creditors are then forced to use other means to collect, such as targeting the founder’s assets.

因此，债权人被迫使用其他手段收回资金，比如把目光转向创始人的资产。

In the case of LeEco, Mr Jia and his sister had pledged almost all their shares in LeEco’s listed arm against loans, while his brother also borrowed against shares in a connected company.

就乐视而言，贾跃亭和他姐姐将他们在乐视上市子公司的几乎所有股份都质押了，而贾跃亭的哥哥也将其在一家关联公司的股份质押出去。

In early July, a Shanghai court froze more than $180m of LeEco assets belonging to Mr Jia, his brother and Mr Jia’s wife in lieu of missed loan payments. Weeks later, a Beijing court ordered another $33.78m of assets frozen.

今年7月初，上海一家法院将贾跃亭、其兄和其妻名下的1.8亿美元的乐视资产冻结，以顶替未偿付的贷款。几周后，北京一家法院也下令冻结3378万美元资产。

On Monday, the China Securities Regulatory Commission ordered Mr Jia to return to the country to answer questions why he was not following through on a promise to provide an interest-free loan to Leshi, yet another indicator of how the founder’s finances were entangled with the group’s.

本周一，中国证监会(CSRC)责令贾跃亭回国回答有关他未履行为乐视网提供无息借款承诺的问题。这是表明这位创始人的财务与乐视集团财务相互牵扯的又一迹象。

Mr Jia could not be reached for comment.

记者无法联系到贾跃亭就此置评。

Mr Tao says employees at Le Mobile completely stopped taking his calls months ago. He travelled to Beijing, spending four months staking out the parent company’s headquarters. More recently, he pitched a tent in the lobby to force Mr Jia to the negotiating table. He has not been successful.

Felix Tao说，乐视移动的员工在数月前就完全不接他的电话了。他前往北京，花了4个月时间“驻扎”在乐视母公司总部外。最近，他在该集团总部的大堂搭了一个帐篷，希望迫使贾跃亭坐上谈判桌。他没能成功。

“The company will not listen to us. Then they hired people to lock us out of the lobby,” says Mr Tao.

他说：“该公司不听我们的话。后来他们雇了人把我们锁在大堂外面。”