土耳其与美国很难重修旧好

At the start of the Obama administration, when I took over the Europe portfolio at the state department, one of the brightest spots on the foreign policy horizon was Turkey. Here was a majority Muslim country with a dynamic and popular leader that was reforming its growing economy, expanding press freedoms and easing the once-repressive military establishment out of politics.

在奥巴马政府上台伊始，我接手了美国国务院欧洲事务助理国务卿一职，当时土耳其是美国外交政策方面的亮点之一。这是一个穆斯林占多数的国家，那时，他们充满活力又广受爱戴的领导人正在改革土耳其快速发展的经济、扩大媒体自由以及让一度专制的军方逐渐退出政治事务。

It was eagerly pursuing EU membership and co-operating closely with the US and EU on Afghanistan, Iraq and Middle East peace. So hopeful was Barack Obama that success in Turkey could help demonstrate that it was possible for a Middle Eastern country to be Muslim, democratic and pro-western that he insisted on adding stops in Istanbul and Ankara to his first foreign trip. He told the Turkish parliament that the US and Turkey could build a “model partnership”. The visit would send a “message to the world”.

当时土耳其热切期望加入欧盟(EU)，并与美国和欧盟在阿富汗、伊拉克和中东的和平事务上积极合作。巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)曾充满希望地认为，土耳其的成功也许有助于证明，一个中东国家可以是穆斯林国家，同时又是民主的、亲西方的，因此他坚持要在自己第一次外交访问中加入伊斯坦布尔(Istanbul)和安卡拉(Ankara)两站。他告诉土耳其国会，美国和土耳其能够建立一种“模范伙伴关系”。这次访问将“向全世界传递出一则信息”。

Today, less than a decade later, that vision is a shambles — and the relationship is probably beyond repair. Fleeting hopes that the Trump administration might put things back on track, based on the US president’s affinity for strongmen such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, have quickly faded. Instead, the two countries are discovering how fundamentally their core security interests have diverged. They are rapidly sliding into a cycle of mutual resentment that could easily get out of hand.

在不到十年后的今天，局面却变得一团糟——美土之间也许已无法重修旧好。基于现任美国总统特朗普与像土耳其总统雷杰普•塔伊普•埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)这样的铁腕人物合得来，人们也曾期盼特朗普政府能让事情重回正轨，但这样的希望很快就变得渺茫了。相反，两国正发现各自的核心安全利益存在根本分歧。美土两国正迅速陷入一个相互怨恨的怪圈，事态很容易变得一发不可收拾。

The most recent flare-up started with Turkey’s detention of a growing number of US citizens caught up in Mr Erdogan’s mass round-up — over 50,000 Turks have so far been imprisoned — following the July 2016 coup attempt. American concern about the arrests grew considerably last summer, when Turkey began treating the US detainees as bargaining chips, suggesting they could be freed if Washington extradited Fethullah Gulen, the Turkish cleric Mr Erdogan accuses of masterminding the coup from his residence in Pennsylvania. After Turkey last week arrested a Turkish national who worked at a US consulate, the second such arrest this year, Washington announced it was suspending visa services in Turkey, publicly questioning Ankara’s commitment to protecting “the security of US mission facilities and personnel”. Turkey immediately responded in kind, with aides to Mr Erdogan claiming that Washington’s real motivation was to prevent its former employee from revealing an alleged, but unsubstantiated, US role in the coup. The escalating crisis will damage both countries’ business and tourism sectors, especially Turkey’s.

美土之间最近一次剑拔弩张始于在埃尔多安的大规模围捕下，越来越多的美国公民被土耳其当局拘捕。自2016年7月土耳其政变未遂后，迄今已有超过5万名土耳其人被拘禁。美国方面对土耳其当局的抓捕行动从今年夏天起更感忧心，当时土耳其开始用被捕的美国公民作为与美国讨价还价的筹码，土耳其表示，如果华盛顿方面同意引渡费特胡拉•居伦(Fethullah Gulen)，这些美国公民就会得到释放。居伦是土耳其的一名传教士，埃尔多安指控他在宾夕法尼亚州的居所策划了去年的政变。土耳其上周逮捕了一名曾在美国领事馆工作的土耳其公民，这是今年土耳其当局实施的第二起类似逮捕，华盛顿当局随即宣布暂停美国在土耳其的签证服务，公开质疑安卡拉有关保护“美国使团设施和人员安全”的承诺。土耳其立即以牙还牙，埃尔多安的助手称，美国的真正动机是为了防止其前雇员泄露美国在土耳其政变中可疑、但尚未得到证实的角色。这场逐渐升级的危机将对两国(尤其是土耳其)的商业和旅游业造成损害。

Mr Erdogan and many Turks are furious, convinced the Americans fail to appreciate the severity of the coup, Mr Gulen’s role, and the existential threats they face. Many Americans, in turn, believe the greater problem is the authoritarian response to the coup, and using it as a pretext to pursue all those who oppose Mr Erdogan.

埃尔多安和许多土耳其人很愤怒，他们相信美国人没有认识到那场政变的严重性、居伦所扮演的角色，以及他们所面临的生存威胁。反过来，许多美国人认为，更大的问题是土耳其当局对政变做出的专制反应，以及以政变为借口追捕所有反对埃尔多安的人士的行为。

The two countries’ regional security interests have also dangerously diverged. Whereas Washington prioritises the fight against Isis, Turkey is far more concerned with the threat it perceives from the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds — who happen to be America’s main partners in that fight. The US is determined to prevent Iran from filling the vacuum created when Isis forces are driven from eastern Syria. Washington is almost certain to continue to back those Kurds, potentially provoking a violent Turkish response. Turkey’s vocal support for Islamist groups such as Hamas, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Libyan militias, its burgeoning military relationship with Qatar, and its recent decision to rebuff Nato and purchase Russian air-defence systems — a move itself designed to signal its displeasure with the US — will only exacerbate these divisions.

两国的地区安全利益也出现了危险的分歧。华盛顿把打击“伊斯兰国”(ISIS)列为优先事项，而土耳其更关心可能来自叙利亚和伊拉克库尔德人的威胁——这些库尔德人正是美国在打击ISIS行动中的主要合作伙伴。美国决心防止伊朗填补ISIS部队被从叙利亚东部赶走而出现的真空。美国也几乎肯定会继续支持那些库尔德人，这有可能激发土耳其的暴力反应。土耳其声援哈马斯(Hamas)、埃及穆斯林兄弟会(Muslim Brotherhood)和利比亚民兵等伊斯兰组织，与卡塔尔迅速发展军事关系，最近还决定拒绝北约(Nato)要求从俄罗斯购买防空系统——此举意在表明其对美国的不满——这一切行动只会加剧美土分歧。

As Mr Erdogan and his party continue to whip up hostility to America for supporting enemies real and imagined, Turkish attitudes towards the US have descended, unsurprisingly, to new lows. Today only 13 per cent of Turks have a positive perception of US ideas, and 72 per cent of Turks feel threatened by US power and influence, according to Pew. Turkish attitudes toward Americans have never, of course, been particularly positive, but in the absence of a common threat to hold the alliance together the absence of positive mutual feelings will become ever more apparent.

埃尔多安及其政党继续以美国支持其真实和想象中的敌人为由，煽动民众对美国的敌意，毫不奇怪，土耳其人对美国的观感降到了历史新低。皮尤(Pew)的民意调查显示，现在只有13%的土耳其人对美国的信念抱有积极看法，72%的土耳其人感到美国的实力和影响力构成威胁。当然，土耳其人对美国的态度从来都不是特别正面，但如果没有共同的威胁来维系美土联盟，相互之间缺乏正面观感的问题就会变得愈发明显。

Americans have understandably wanted to ignore these realities for some time, given Turkey’s geopolitical importance. But it is now past time that they start to see and treat Turkey for what it is — a Middle Eastern country with its own values and priorities — and not as the like-minded, close and reliable ally they may wish it would be. That means continuing to co-operate where possible, but having no illusions, and standing up firmly when differences appear, such as when Mr Erdogan starts taking US citizens hostage.

考虑到土耳其在地缘政治中的重要性，可以理解，美国人在一段时间里曾想忽略这些现实。但美国早就该按照土耳其的本来面貌来认识和对待这个国家——一个有自身价值观和优先事项的中东国家——而不是把土耳其当做美国人所希望的那种志同道合、亲密可靠的盟友。这意味着继续在可能的领域与土耳其合作，但不抱幻想，在有分歧的时候坚持立场，比如当埃尔多安开始把美国公民扣为人质时。

When he first brought up possible prisoner swaps last August at a political party rally, Mr Erdogan exclaimed: “The old Turkey is no longer. This Turkey is the new Turkey!” He is right, and the US now needs to treat it as such.

今年8月，当埃尔多安在一个政党集会上首次提出囚犯互换的可能时，他大声疾呼：“旧的土耳其不复存在。现在的土耳其是一个新的土耳其!”他是对的，而美国现在也需要如此看待土耳其。

The writer is Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former US assistant secretary of state

本文作者是美国外交关系委员会(Council on Foreign Relations)玛丽和戴维•博伊斯高级研究员，曾任美国助理国务卿