想在亚洲称雄的高盛必须面对激烈竞争
高盛(Goldman Sachs)还是想当第一。就此而言，这是高盛的惯常做派，这家银行喜欢在每次报告盈利时夸耀其在全球排行榜上的榜首位置。
But the ambition here relates to Asia’s equity capital markets — a market increasingly dominated by Chinese business the US bank cannot get. Is this brash overconfidence, or a shrewd bet on the long-term future of what has become the world’s biggest equity capital-raising region?
但这里的抱负说的是亚洲股权资本市场——该市场日益由这家美资银行争取不到的中国业务主导。高盛的抱负究竟是自以为是的过度自信，还是对亚洲这个世界最大股本募集地区的长远未来的精明押注?
Goldman’s decision to maintain its top spot target follows a shocker of a year in 2016, where the bank failed to even make the top 10 in Asia-Pacific, according to Dealogic, after two decades in which it had never dropped lower than fourth.
力争榜首的决定是在高盛经历了令人震惊的2016年后做出的。根据Dealogic的数据，2016年该行甚至没能进入亚太排行榜前10名，而此前20年期间该行从未跌出前四名。
Its 15th-place finish in the region left it unable to tout a global number-one ECM ranking for the first time in six years. Even more galling will have been the fact that Morgan Stanley finished top in Asia last year, one of only three non-Chinese banks to make the grade, ahead of Deutsche Bank in fourth and UBS in seventh.2016年高盛在亚太地区屈居第15名，这使其6年来首次无法标榜自己荣居股权资本市场(ECM)全球排行榜榜首。更让高盛窝火的是摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)去年在亚洲摘得桂冠，而且是挤入前10名的三家非中资银行之一，另外两家是排在第4的德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)和排在第7的瑞银(UBS)。
Put a league table in front of a banker who cannot boast the top spot, and brace for a stream of reasons why the tables do not matter, how any old bank can get credit, why no one follows them any more and why what really matters is which bank made money.
把排行榜放在无法吹嘘所在银行获得第一的银行家面前，准备好听听他抛出的一连串理由吧——为什么这些排行榜不重要，为什么任何老牌银行都能够在排行榜上名列前茅，为什么没有人再关心排行榜，以及为什么真正重要的是哪家银行赚到了钱。
In Asia, which holds the global record for bookrunners credited with an initial public offering — 26 to sell $2bn of equity — and where deal fees can still amount to a nominal rupee or renminbi, that last point has real merit.
亚洲曾创下最多承销商参与一次首次公开发行(IPO)的全球纪录——多达26家承销商帮助中国邮政储蓄银行出售了20亿美元的股权——而且亚洲的交易佣金依然微薄，往往只是很小的一笔卢比或者人民币，因此上述最后一点的确有道理。
But league tables can still speak to a bank’s ambition, and in Asia, its assessment of a fast-changing — and growing — landscape. In the first half of this year, ECM deals in Asia totalled $136.7bn, putting the region ahead of the US on $126.6bn.
但排行榜依然表明一家银行的抱负，及其对快速变化且越来越大的亚洲市场格局的评估。今年上半年，亚洲的股权资本市场交易总额达到1367亿美元，使该地区超过了美国的1266亿美元。
Equity business is proportionally more important in the region too, since it makes up on average about 40 per cent of the fee pool, compared with 25 per cent globally.
与此同时，股权业务在比例上在亚洲地区更为重要，因为该地区股权业务平均占佣金池的40%，而在全球范围这个比例为25%。
Goldman’s poor showing last year was partly due to its absence in some important deals, including a $6.6bn convertible bond from SoftBank that helped the Japanese dealmaker cash out some of its Alibaba stake.
高盛去年表现糟糕的部分原因是其缺席了一些重要的交易，包括日本交易撮合者软银(SoftBank)发行66亿美元的可转债，帮助变现其在阿里巴巴(Alibaba)所持股权。
The sheer volume of mainland China deals is a longer-term threat to Goldman and its international rivals, who get only the smallest share of this business. In the first half of this year, onshore China accounted for 46 per cent of all equity deal volume in the region. Last year’s 15th place prompted a discussion among the bank’s senior ranks in the region: was a commitment to aiming for top spot in the equity business worth it? Or would it too, like many rivals, have to learn to box clever?
中国内地庞大的交易规模给高盛及其国际竞争对手构成了更长期威胁;它们只能得到这块业务的很小一部分。今年上半年，中国境内股本交易总量占到地区总量的46%。去年位列第15的名次引发了高盛亚洲高层内部的一场讨论：力争股本业务第一的投入值得吗?或者它也应该像很多竞争对手一样，学会灵活应对?
Western banks have since the financial crisis focused on their strengths and on balance sheet discipline. That is especially necessary in Asia, where each country needs a genuine local presence.
自金融危机以来，西方银行一直聚焦于提高自身实力和遵守资产负债表纪律。这对亚洲来说尤为必要，这里的每个国家都需要金融机构真正落地。
Big international banks also face powerful domestic competition. In any good year for Japan, Nomura and Daiwa Securities muscle their way back into the league table top 10. The same goes for China, only more so because of its size. No international bank makes the top 10 when ranked by China-related equity revenues.
大型国际银行还面临激烈的本土竞争。在日本，野村证券(Nomura)和大和证券(Daiwa Securities)在任何一个景气年份都有望重返排行榜前10名之列。中国也一样，而且因为其规模而更加突出。若以中国相关股本交易的收入排名，没有一家国际银行能跻身前10。
Western bankers often point out that most onshore deals are not business they would want, partly because profits are so small they make Hong Kong’s miserly average fee of 2 per cent look good (New York’s is 5-7 per cent). Also, they say that the reputational risk from much onshore business is too great.
西方银行人士常常指出，大多数境内交易都不是他们想要的业务，部分是因为利润微薄，它们使香港平均2%的微薄佣金率都显得相对优厚(纽约的佣金率为5%-7%)。此外，他们还表示，很多境内业务带来的声誉风险太大了。
Goldman’s top-spot ambition therefore implies it believes either the Chinese market will open to foreigners or that it can win more business offshore in Hong Kong.
因此，高盛想当第一的抱负意味着，要么它认为中国市场将向外国人开放，要么它可以在香港拿到更多境外业务。
Both are probably true to some extent. The bank has long pushed for foreign companies to be allowed majority control — suggesting it wants a greater presence onshore. If it also wants a greater share of the onshore equity business, that is a bet that deal quality will also improve.
在某种程度上，两种想法可能都没错。该行长期推动允许外资企业在华获得多数控股权——似乎表明它希望在中国境内扩大业务地盘。如果它也希望得到更大份额的境内股本业务，那意味着押注于交易质量也将改善。
“Number one is what we do. It’s why people want to work here,” says one Goldmanite. “And we think there is more than enough profitable work for us with Chinese companies who want exposure to international markets.”
“拿到第一是我行应该做的事情。这是人们想在这工作的原因，”一名高盛人表示，“而且我们认为，鉴于有很多中国企业想要获得国际市场敞口，有足够的有利可图的业务可以做。”
This year the bank has fought back, reclaiming the region’s top spot ahead of China’s Citic Securities and CICC, as well as Morgan Stanley and UBS. The busiest months in the Hong Kong equity calendar — its regional home turf — are to come, too.
今年高盛已经采取了反击，赢回了地区第一的位置，领先于中国的中信证券(Citic Securities)和中国国际金融股份有限公司(CICC，简称中金公司)、以及摩根士丹利和瑞银。高盛在亚洲的大本营香港股本交易最繁忙的月份也即将到来。
But it will have to fight harder still against its Chinese rivals to retain that regional crown for long.
但它将必须与中国竞争对手展开更激烈的较量，才能保住地区冠军的桂冠。
