过度炒作会毁了初创企业

Start-ups often live or die by publicity. A successful marketing pitch early in a venture’s life can grab media attention — and place it firmly in the minds of potential consumers.

宣传往往会让初创企业生存或毁灭。在创业伊始，成功的市场营销能够抓住媒体的眼球，并让潜在消费者对公司印象深刻。

One tactic is to seize on a topic that has already gained traction in the media. SoFi, the US online lender, this year saw its chance to exploit comments by Tim Gurner, an Australian real estate developer, who claimed millennials could not afford to buy a house because they spent too much on luxury food — specifically smashed avocado toast and coffee.

策略之一是捕捉媒体关注的热点话题。SoFi，美国的一家网贷公司，今年就瞅准机会好好利用了一下澳洲一位房产商蒂姆•格纳(Tim Gurner)的评论。格纳说，千禧一代买不起房，因为他们花在高档食品上的钱太多——比如牛油果吐司和咖啡。

SoFi, founded in 2011 as a student loan refinancer, was expanding into mortgage lending. What better way to lure new customers with not only a competitive rate but also a free side order of the trendy snack?

SoFi成立于2011年，从学生再融资贷款起步，随后将业务拓展到抵押贷款领域。还有什么比这更好的法子吸引新客户吗?不仅贷款利率有竞争力，还免费附赠时尚小吃。

US news outlets picked up the headline-friendly story. And SoFi, valued at $4bn following its most recent round of funding in February, has the capacity to meet an increase in demand.

美国媒体报道了这则标题友好的新闻，而SoFi也已经具备满足需求增长的实力。在今年2月的最近一轮融资中，SoFi的估值已达40亿美元。

But what happens if media attention arrives too soon? The tech press is littered with stories of much-hyped start-ups that garner headlines — and in some cases raise lots of money — but are unable to deliver on the promise of their publicity. Can media buzz harm more than it helps?

然而如果媒体关注来得过快会怎么样呢?科技类媒体有很多关于初创企业的天花乱坠的报道，它们占据着头条位置——有时还筹集了大量资金——但却无法兑现宣传时的承诺。媒体炒作会不会弊大于利?

Todd Berger has reason to think so. In 2014, the graphic designer and a few friends founded a social network called Ello, aimed at fellow artists, designers and creative professionals.

托德•伯杰(Todd Berger)就有理由这样认为。2014年，这位平面设计师和几位朋友一起创建了一个名为Ello的社交网站，主要面向艺术家、设计师及其他从事创意行业的专业人士。

Ello vowed to be free from advertising and its “manifesto” promised not to collect or sell users’ data. New members could only join on invitation from existing users, a limitation aimed at cultivating what Mr Berger describes as “a place on the internet focused on putting creators first and providing real visibility, influence and opportunity”.

Ello号称无广告，其“宣言”承诺绝不收集或出卖用户的数据。新成员只有接受现有用户的邀请方可加入，目的是要在互联网上打造出伯杰先生所描述的“以创作者为先，提供真实的关注度、影响力和机会的一方天地”。

In September of that year, Ello went mainstream. The catalyst was Facebook, which in 2014 enforced more strictly a policy requiring users to use their legal names on their profiles.

在当年9月，Ello成了社交网络的主流。契机是2014年Facebook更加严苛地要求用户使用实名注册。

This sparked outrage from transgender rights advocates and domestic violence survivors, who often used aliases; and Native Americans, whose names were often flagged as fake, among others. Some went looking for an alternative, and found Ello. The company was deluged with requests to join.

这引发了跨性别维权人士和家暴幸存者们(这些人经常使用化名)、印第安人(他们的名字常常被标记为假名)等群体的不满。有些人转而去寻找一个可以取代Facebook的网站，于是发现了Ello。一时间Ello的注册申请纷至沓来。

“The onslaught of people coming to Ello from the LBGTQ community really tipped the scale and contributed to lots more buzz,” Mr Berger says. In the media, Ello was quickly cast as a potential “Facebook killer”.

伯杰说：“来自LGBTQ群体的成员蜂拥涌入切实扭转了格局并为Ello带来了更多的关注。”很快媒体就将Ello称为一个潜在的“Facebook杀手”。

News outlets picked up on its manifesto, which seemed to take aim at the world’s largest social network, proclaiming: “Your social network is owned by advertisers . . . You are the product that’s bought and sold.” Ello’s founders, who were in the midst of raising their first round of funding, tried to ride the wave.

新闻媒体重又提起Ello的宣言，这份宣言似乎针对的是全球最大的社交网络，它宣称：“广告商才是你们社交网络的主子……你们本身就是被买卖的商品。”Ello的创始人，正忙于他们的第一轮融资，试图利用媒体造势。

“We were growing rapidly, to say the least, but without the resources, leadership or experience to see what was about to happen,” recalls Mr Berger, who at the time was Ello’s head of graphic design. “Ultimately we embraced it.”

“我们当时至少可以说是正在迅速成长，但我们缺乏资源、领导能力或经验，无法预知将会发生什么，”伯杰先生回忆，那时他是Ello的平面设计主管。“但最终，我们接受了一切。”

The instinct to capitalise on unexpected attention is understandable. Academics have tried to quantify the value of publicity and this much is clear: media coverage is associated with business success.

本能地利用始料未及的关注度是可以理解的。学者们曾试图量化宣传的功效，至少有一点很明确：媒体报道与商业成功是相关联的。

Research from Babson College in the US suggests the media wants stories about flourishing start-ups — but, equally, those fledgling companies should not necessarily chase the media buzz.

美国巴布森学院(Babson College)的研究显示，媒体喜欢报道朝气蓬勃的初创企业的故事——但与此同时，那些刚起步的公司不必追求媒体的大肆宣传。

Professor Andrew Zacharakis, who teaches entrepreneurship at Babson and who co-wrote the research, cautions: “Don’t get ahead of yourself. In the age of the unicorns, everyone wants to be next superstar, but we don’t want those valuations to be based on vapourware.” He points to Ello as a cautionary tale “where the story overcame what the business really was”.

安德鲁•查克罗基斯(Andrew Zacharakis)教授在巴布森商学院教创业学，同时也是这份研究报告的联合撰稿人，他提醒人们：“不要急于求成。在独角兽频现的时代，人人都想成为下一个超级巨星，但我们不希望这些估值是镜花水月。”他指出Ello的故事就是“名不副实的宣传”，并希望人们能够引以为戒。

Mr Berger agrees: “As a function of all the media hype, we had lost our way, lost control of our narrative, and we had naively embraced a new narrative that wasn’t our own.”

伯杰先生认为：“所有的媒体炒作引发的效应之一就是，我们迷失了方向、无法控制媒体对我们的宣传表述、并天真地接受了一个并不属实的全新演绎。”

When Ello took off, its staff was just seven people who worked part-time while running other businesses. They were soon overwhelmed. The platform was not robust enough to support demand: the site crashed and Ello had to freeze invitations. Once new users were able to join, many were disappointed with what they found.

Ello大热时，只有7名工作人员，他们只是在Ello兼职。很快这几个人就被压垮了。这个平台还无法支撑海量的申请需求：网站崩溃了，Ello也不得不冻结对新用户的邀请。一旦新用户能够加入了，许多人却对他们的体验感到失望。

“Our product was very nascent. You could post and follow other members, and that’s about it . . . You couldn’t even comment yet,” Mr Berger says.

伯杰称：“我们的产品还很稚嫩。你可以发帖并关注别人，而这就是全部功能……那时甚至还无法发表评论。”

“What we had product-wise wasn’t enough to start comparing ourselves to Facebook and acting like we were about to unseat the leader in the social space. In so doing, we created an environment of un-met expectations via hyperbole and misplaced zealousness.”

“就产品本身而言，我们还不能跟Facebook媲美，无法去撼动社交空间领导者的地位。就这样，通过夸大其词和不应有的热忱，我们创造了一个与人们的期望值不符的环境。”

The company had to deal with the influx of press requests, which Mr Berger says distracted from other tasks, such as coming up with a sustainable growth strategy.

公司不得不去应付众多媒体，伯杰先生称，这让公司无法专心处理其他事务，比如制定可持续发展战略。

“In hindsight, we would have hit pause and more deeply considered the ramifications of leaning into a narrative that felt virtually impossible to support and execute against successfully,” he says.

他说：“事后看来，我们本该按下暂停键，更深地思考接受这样一种让人感觉几乎不可能去支撑和成功落实的宣传的后果。”

As quickly as Ello’s popularity lit up, it fizzled. Within a few weeks, the press had moved on to other subjects, and the surge of new users subsided. Today, Ello still exists as a network for artists and creatives, but is most often cited as an example of a start-up failing to live up to the hype.

就像当初人气迅速爆棚一样，人们对Ello的热情也很快消失。短短几周，媒体关注的焦点就转向其他话题，新用户也不再激增。如今，Ello仍是一个面向艺术家和创作者的社交网络，但却作为一个与宣传不符的初创企业案例被频频引用。

For Mr Berger, who now serves as Ello’s chief executive, the lesson is simple. “A good product speaks for itself. There’s no amount of marketing or storytelling that will make an incomplete, undeveloped product a great one,” he says.

对于现任Ello首席执行官的伯杰先生而言，这次事件的教训很简单。伯杰先生称：“优质的产品本身就能说明一切。任何营销或宣传都无法让一个尚未完善的、还不成熟的产品变得伟大。”

“Press is only as good as the extent to which you can back up the narrative you are investing in creating and sharing. That narrative has to be real and you have to be able to support it.”

“媒体宣传只在某种程度上适用，那就是你能够支持你精心构建并分享给他人的故事。故事的讲述必须真实，而且你也必须有能力支撑它。”