我是美军士兵，我这样学会杀人

How We Learned to Kill

我是美军士兵，我这样学会杀人

THE voice on the other end of the radio said: “There are two people digging by the side of the road. Can we shoot them?”

无线电另一端的声音响起：“有两个人在路边挖土。我们可以向他们开枪吗?”

It was the middle of the night during my first week in Afghanistan in 2010, on the northern edge of American operations in Helmand Province, and they were directing the question to me. Were the men in their sights irrigating their farmland or planting a roadside bomb? The Marines reported seeing them digging and what appeared to be packages in their possession. Farmers in the valley work from sunrise to sundown, and seeing anyone out after dark was largely unheard-of.

这是2010年的一天半夜，我到阿富汗还不到一周，位置是在赫尔曼德省美军活动区域的北部边缘，而他们把这个问题提给了我。他们看到的这两个男人是在灌溉农田呢，还是在路边埋炸弹?来自海军陆战队的士兵报告说看到他们在挖土，似乎带着包裹。这里的农民日出而作，日落而息，几乎没听说过天黑后还看到有人外出。

My initial reaction was to ask the question to someone higher up the chain of command. I looked around our combat operations center for someone more senior and all I saw were young Marines looking back at me to see what I would do.

我的最初反应是询问上级指挥官。于是我环顾作战中心的四周，寻找级别更高的军官，结果看到的都是年轻的海军陆战队士兵。他们回视我，看我将如何决定。

I wanted confirmation from a higher authority to do the abhorrent, something I’d spent my entire life believing was evil. With no higher power around, I realized it was my role as an officer to provide that validation to the Marine on the other end who would pull the trigger.

我想从上级那里获得批准，做一件我向来视为邪恶的事情。由于没有其他上级在场，我意识到，批准无线电另一端的海军陆战队员扣动扳机，是我作为一名军官的职责。

“Take the shot,” I responded. It was dialogue from the movies that I’d grown up with, but I spoke the words without irony. I summarily ordered the killing of two men. I wanted the Marine on the other end to give me a reason to change my decision, but the only sound I heard was the radio affirmative for an understood order: “Roger, out.” Shots rang out across the narrow river. A part of me wanted the rounds to miss their target, but they struck flesh and the men fell dead.

“动手，”我回答。这是我自小看的那些电影中的对白，但我的口气里并没有讽刺。我干脆利落地下令干掉这两名男子。虽然希望另一端的队员给我一个理由，让我改变决定，但无线电传来的唯一回答是“收到”，表示他们理解这个命令。枪声大作，飞向小河的另一边。我有些希望他们射偏了。但他们命中了目标，那两名男子倒地身亡。

When I originally became an infantry officer, increasing my Marines’ ability to kill was my mission, and it was my primary focus as I led them to Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, as a young lieutenant, I had faith in my Marines; I trusted them and looked up to them. But in the back of my mind, I always wondered whether they would follow my orders in the moment of truth. As the echoes of gunfire reverberated and faded, I received my answer. Yes, they would follow me. I also received affirmation to a more sinister question: Yes, I could kill.

我最初当上步兵军官时，提升队员的杀人能力就是我的使命;当我带领他们奔赴伊拉克和阿富汗时，这就是我的主要侧重点。现在，作为一名年轻的中尉，我对手下的海军陆战队员们很有信心;我信任他们，尊重他们。但在内心深处，我一直不确定他们在关键时刻是否会服从我的命令。随着枪声的回荡和消退，我知道了这个问题的答案。是的，他们会服从我的命令。对于一个更加邪恶的问题，我也得到了答案：是的，我可以杀人。

II.

二

The primary factors that affect an individual’s ability to kill are the demands of authority, group absolution, the predisposition of the killer, the distance from the victim and the target attractiveness of the victim.

“影响一个人杀戮能力的主要因素是权威的命令、集体脱罪意识、杀人者的性情、与被杀者之间的距离，以及目标是否引人注意。”

So began the essay I wrote during my Marine Corps infantry officer training in 2008. The assignment said, “Discuss the factors that affect an individual’s ability to kill.” I focused on lessons I had learned reading Lt. Col. Dave Grossman’s book “On Killing,” which deconstructs the psychology of taking human life. It explains how, throughout the past century, military social systems and training evolved to make humans less reluctant to take a life. But while Mr. Grossman’s work was descriptive, my training was prescriptive.

这是我2008接受海军陆战队步兵军官培训时，写的一篇作业的开头。作业要求“讨论影响一个人杀戮能力的因素”。我阅读过戴维·格罗斯曼中校 (Dave Grossman)的作品《杀戮》(On Killing)，于是在文中重点阐述了从该书中学到的东西。这本书解构了杀戮的心理元素，解释了在过去一个世纪里，军队社会结构和军事训练的发展，如何降低了人类对杀戮的抵触。不过，虽然格罗斯曼的作品娓娓道来，我接受的训练却具体到各种条条框框。

Before I was given the authority to order a kill, I trained to do it by hand. I practiced the techniques of killing for more than a year before taking command of a platoon. I became the master of my rifle, thrust my bayonet through human-shaped dummies, and only then learned the more advanced methods of modern warfare: how to maneuver a platoon of 40 Marines and call for artillery barrages and aerial bombardments. But mastering the tactics of killing would have been useless if I wasn’t willing to kill.

在被赋予下令杀戮的权力之前，我受过亲手杀人的训练。在成为一个排的指挥官之前，我练习了一年多的杀人技术。我的步枪技能变得很娴熟，还用刺刀捅过人形靶子，然后才学习了现代战争的先进手段：如何指挥一排40个海军陆战队员行动，并请求炮击和空中轰炸支援。但如果我不愿意杀人，掌握再多的杀人手法也毫无用处。

In war, of course, there are many ways to kill. I did so by giving orders. I never fired my weapon in combat, but I ordered countless others to fire theirs. It was a disorienting sort of power to have: I would speak a few words, and a few seconds, minutes or hours later people would die. Of course, our snipers became the celebrities of our deployment because they were the best killers. They would perch in their hide, watching the villagers through high-powered optics that allowed them to see faces from hundreds of yards away. They would watch and wait until the moment when they could identify an enemy among the civilians. The fighters would fall before the echo of the shot reached their dead bodies. They would truly never know what hit them.

当然，在战争中，致人毙命的方法有很多。我通过发号施令来杀人。我从来没有在战斗中亲自开火，但是我无数次下令让别人开火。这是一种会让人丧失神志的权力：我只要说几个词，然后几秒钟、几分钟或几小时后，就会有人丧命。当然，狙击手是我们这里的名人，因为他们是最好的杀手。藏身在隐蔽点，借助高性能的光学设备，他们可以从几百码外分辨出村民的面目，经过长时间的观察和等待，直到找出混在平民中的敌人。然后这些激进分子分子会中弹倒下，枪声传到跟前时他们已经身亡，永远都不会有机会知道击中自己的究竟是什么。

Before killing the first time there’s a reluctance that tempers the desire to know whether you are capable of doing it. It is not unlike teenagers longing to lose their virginity but also wanting to wait for the right time to do it. But once killing loses its mystique, it no longer becomes a tool of last resort.

第一次杀人之前，虽然你渴望知道自己是否真的能够做到这种事，但仍会感到犹豫不决。和少男少女向往失去童贞、但又想等待合适的时机比起来，这并没有什么不同。但杀戮一旦失去了神秘性，它就再也不是一种不得已而为之的手段了。

In Marine officer training we were taught to be decisive. Even a bad decision, I was told, is better than no decision at all. But the combination of imperfect judgment, the confidence of authority and absolute decisiveness does not produce measured outcomes.

海军陆战队军官的训练课程教导我们，行事要果断。他人告诉我，即使做出一个错误的决定，也总比没有决定要好。可是，有缺陷的判断、对上级的信心和绝对的果断加在一起，并不会产生可靠的结果。

For a while after I ordered the Marine to take that first shot, everything we did seemed acceptable. It revealed that killing could be banal. Each day would bring a new threat that needed to be eliminated. Bombs would drop, Marines would fire and artillery would blanket hills with explosions. I had a rough estimate of how many people we killed, but I stopped counting after a while.

我第一次下令士兵动手后，有那么一段时间，我们做的一切事情貌似都是可以接受的。这说明杀戮可以成为稀松平常的事情。每一天都会冒出新的威胁需要解除。炸弹将被投下，士兵将会开火，山丘将被炮火覆盖。我曾经大致估计过我们杀死的人数，但过了一段时间之后，我就放弃了。

III.

三

I spent every day of my seven-month deployment in Afghanistan trying to figure out how to kill the Taliban commander in my area. He lived and operated to our north and every day would send his soldiers down to plant bombs, terrorize the villages and wrestle with us for control of the area. Our mission was to secure the villages and provide economic and political development, but that was slow work with intangible results. Killing the Taliban commander would be an objective measure of success.

我被派遣到阿富汗的7个月里，每一天都在想方设法干掉我驻扎的这个地区的塔利班指挥官。他居住和活动位置在我们北面，每天都会派手下到南边来埋炸弹，恐吓村民，和我们争夺这个地区的控制权。我们的使命是保障村庄的安全，促进其经济和政治发展，但是这种工作进展缓慢，效果往往是无形的。击毙塔利班指挥官就成了衡量成果的一个客观标准。

I never killed him. Instead, each day we would kill his soldiers or his soldiers would kill our Marines. The longer I lived among the Afghans, the more I realized that neither the Taliban nor we were fighting for the reasons I expected. Despite the rhetoric I internalized from the newspapers back home about why we were in Afghanistan, I ended up fighting for different reasons once I got on the ground — a mix of loyalty to my Marines, habit and the urge to survive.

我一直都没能除掉他。但每一天我们都会杀死他的手下，或者我们的队员被他们杀死。我待在阿富汗时间越长，就越是意识到，无论是塔利班还是我们，都不是在为我原本以为的目的而战斗。尽管美国报纸大谈我们出兵阿富汗的原因，我也已经潜移默化地接受了那种论述，但我一到达这里，就开始出于别的理由而战斗：对队员的忠诚、习惯，以及生存冲动。

The enemy fighters were often young men raised alongside poppy fields in small farms set up like latticework along the river. They must have been too young and too isolated to understand anything outside of their section of the valley, never mind something global like the 9/11 attacks. These villagers fought us because that’s what they always did when foreigners came to their village. Perhaps they just wanted to be left alone.

沿河是一小块一小块的罂粟田，敌方的作战人员往往是在这些罂粟田边长大的年轻人。他们想必太年轻、太与世隔绝，对这片山谷之外的事情全然不懂，更别说9·11恐怖袭击这样的全球大事了。这些村民抗击我们，是因为但凡有外来者来到他们的村庄，他们都会抗击。也许他们只是不想被人打扰。

The more I thought about the enemy, the harder it was to view them as evil or subhuman. But killing requires a motivation, so the concept of self-defense becomes the defining principle of target attractiveness. If someone is shooting at me, I have a right to fire back. But this is a legal justification, not a moral one. The comic Louis C.K. brilliantly pointed out this absurdity: “Maybe if you pick up a gun and go to another country and you get shot, it’s not that weird. Maybe if you get shot by the dude you were just shooting at, it’s a tiny bit your fault.”

我对敌人思考得越多，就越难将他们视为恶魔或非人。但是杀戮需要一个动机，因此自卫就成为了瞄准目标的主要理由。如果有人朝我开枪，我就有还击的权利。但这是法律上的理由，不是道德理由。搞笑的路易斯·C·K(Louis C.K.)精辟地指出了这个说法的荒诞性：“你拿起一把枪，前去另一个国家，结果你被击中了，这事大概算不上奇怪。如果你正要向某个家伙开枪，他却击中了你，你自己也有点错吧。”

My worst fear before deploying was what, in training, we called “good shoot, bad result.” But there is no way in the chaos and uncertainty of war to make the right decision all the time. On one occasion, the Taliban had been shooting at us and we thought two men approaching in the distance were armed and intended to kill us. We warned them off, but it did no good. They continued to approach, and so my Marines fired. What possible reason could two men have to approach a squad of armed Marines in a firefight? When it was over and the two men lay dead we saw that they were unarmed, just two men trying to go home, who never made it.

在训练时，我们谈到过一种“开枪妥当，结果有错”的状况，那是我在被派遣到阿富汗之前最担心的事情。但是在战争的混乱和不确定性中，不可能每次都做出正确的决定。有一次，塔利班向我们开火之后，我们感觉有两个武装分子正在向我们逼近，可能想干掉我们。我们警告他们离开，但没有用。他们还在继续靠近，于是我的队员开了火。两个人在交火中逼近一个海军陆战队小分队，还可能有什么原因?交火结束之后，我们找到这两个人的尸体，发现他们手无寸铁。他们只是想回家，可是却永远回不了家了。

On most occasions, when ordnance would destroy the enemy or a sniper would kill a Taliban fighter, we would engage in the professional congratulations of a job well done like businessmen after a successful client meeting. Nothing of the sort happened after killing a civilian. And in this absence of group absolution, I saw for the first time how critical it actually was for my soul and my sanity.

大多数情况下，当我们用枪炮歼灭敌人，或者狙击手除掉一名塔利班武装后，我们都会好好庆祝一下，就像商人们在成功会见客户之后那样。但发现平民遭到杀害之后，则不会有人进行庆祝。脱离了集体脱罪的环境，我才第一次认识到，那对我的灵魂和心智有多么重要。

Nobody ever talked about the accidental killing. There was paperwork, a brief investigation and silence. You can’t tell someone who has killed an innocent person that he did the right thing even if he followed all the proper procedures before shooting.

从来没有人谈论过这起意外事件。它的文书记录是有的，也进行了一个简短的调查，然后就是沉默。你不能对那个杀死无辜者的人说，他做得对，即使他在开枪之前遵循了所有正当的程序。

When I returned home this group absolution was supposed to take the form of a welcoming society, unlike the one Vietnam veterans returned to. But the only affirmation of my actions came through the ubiquitous “Thank you for your service.” Beyond that, nobody wanted to, or wants to, talk about what occurred overseas.

当我回国的时候，这种集体脱罪的表现应该就是一个欢迎我们归来的社会，与越战老兵回国时的情况不同。但我的行动得到的唯一肯定，是一句随处可见的话：“感谢你的服务”。除此之外，没人想要讨论在国外发生的事情，那时不想，现在也不想。

IV.

四

The first Marine to be grievously injured on our deployment was shot in the neck during a firefight exactly nine years and nine days after the Sept. 11 attacks. He was a 19-year-old from Mississippi on his first tour after enlisting straight out of high school. Under enemy fire, the Navy corpsman and Marines in his squad gave him medical care as the evacuation helicopter raced to get him to the field hospital in the critical “golden hour.”

第一个在执行任务时受重伤的海军陆战队士兵，是在交火时被击中了颈部，当时距离9·11事件正好九年零九天。这名19岁的士兵来自密西西比州，这是他高中毕业后直接参军以来，第一次执行任务。在敌人的炮火下，海军医护兵和他所在小队的士兵对他进行护理，与此同时，救援直升机正在赶来，希望在“黄金时间”里将他送往战地医院。

When he was transported onto the helicopter 40 minutes later, the squad reported that he seemed in good spirits. He would make it to the hospital, receive emergency surgery and then be transported through Germany back to America for a long recovery at Bethesda. Except that didn’t happen. Ten minutes later the call came through the radio that he had died.

40分钟后，他被送上直升机，小队战友报告称他看起来精神状态良好。他能坚持下来，到医院接受紧急手术，然后经由德国被送回美国，在贝塞斯达(Bethesda)度过漫长的康复过程。只可惜，这样的事情没有发生。10分钟后，他们通过无线电打电话称，这名士兵已经死亡。

Until that moment, our deployment in Afghanistan had been exhilarating because we felt invulnerable. This invulnerability in an environment of death was the most powerful sensation I’d ever experienced. I felt favored and possessed with the power to do anything. Instantly, those feelings were replaced by uncertainty and impotency. The initial report that we lost our first Marine stunned everyone who heard it, but soon after came another call about men planting a bomb on a nearby road.

在那一刻之前，我们这些部署在阿富汗的士兵一直都很振奋，因为我们感觉自己坚不可摧。在那种时常有人死亡的环境中，这种坚不可摧的念头，是我体验过的最强有力的感觉。我感觉受到了眷顾，而且痴迷于那种无所不能的感觉。很快，这些感觉就被不确定和无能为力的感觉所取代。我们失去了第一名士兵的消息刚刚传来时，每一个听到的人都震惊了，但我们很快就接到另一个电话，称有人在附近的道路放置炸弹。

Seeing the enemy so quickly after our Marine was killed was the perfect opportunity for revenge. I watched the missile strike the men’s car on the gritty gray-and-white footage of a surveillance drone’s camera and then watched one of them run away on fire and collapse. This was accompanied by the exultation of everyone around me. High-fives. Cheers. Fist pumps. If we couldn’t bring our Marine back to life, at least we could take a life. The power returned to us a little bit. It was an illogical equation but in the moment it rang true.

在我们的士兵被杀后很快就看到了敌人，这是一个绝佳的复仇机会。无人侦察机的摄像头传来了粗糙的灰白画面，我从中看到导弹击中了他们的车，后来又看到其中一人身上着火，在奔逃的过程中倒地不起。我身边的每一个人都狂喜不已，击掌、欢呼、挥舞拳头。如果我们无法救活自己的士兵，至少能夺取敌人的性命。我们的力量恢复了一些。这个思路并不符合逻辑，但当时的感觉就是这样。

V.

五

I could look you in the eye and tell you I’m sure that the two men we killed right after our Marine died were planting a bomb. I remember watching the drone surveillance video as they dug and appeared to drop an explosive device by the side of the road. At the same time, doubt creeps in. The emotions surrounding loss and revenge can distort reality. Maybe it’s too convenient to believe that after losing our first Marine we just happened to find a couple of members of the Taliban planting a bomb. The fog of war doesn’t just limit what you can know; it creates doubt about everything you’re certain that you know.

我可以看着你的眼睛告诉你，我确信，我们在这名士兵死后击毙的两人，当时正在放置炸弹。我记得当时通过无人侦察机拍摄的画面，看到他们在挖坑，似乎是在路边放置一个爆炸装置。与此同时，疑问慢慢产生。那种因为士兵阵亡想要报复而产生的情绪，能够扭曲现实。或许我们相信在失去第一位士兵后，碰巧就发现塔利班成员正在放置炸弹，这有些过于轻易了。但战争的迷雾不仅仅限制了你能知道的事情，还会使你对确信的事产生怀疑。

The madness of war is that while this system is in place to kill people, it may actually be necessary for the greater good. We live in a dangerous world where killing and torture exist and where the persecution of the weak by the powerful is closer to the norm than the civil society where we get our Starbucks. Ensuring our own safety and the defense of a peaceful world may require training boys and girls to kill, creating technology that allows us to destroy anyone on the planet instantly, dehumanizing large segments of the global population and then claiming there is a moral sanctity in killing. To fathom this system and accept its use for the greater good is to understand that we still live in a state of nature.

战争的疯狂之处在于，虽然这套体系的目的是杀人，但对于实现更大的善，实际上或许是必要的。我们生活在一个存在杀戮和折磨的危险世界里，与享用星巴克(Starbucks)的文明社会相比，恃强凌弱的情况在这个世界里更接近常态。确保我们自身的安全，保卫世界的和平，可能需要训练年轻男女怎样杀人，需要创造能使我们立即毁灭地球上所有人的技术，需要将地球上的很多人视作非人，并宣称杀人具有道德神圣性。理解这个体系，接受使用它来实现更大的善，就需要理解，我们仍然生活在一种自然状态。