当今时代的意识形态之战

If 2016 was the year that opponents of the liberal, rules-based world order built up over 70 years won stunning national victories — in Britain and the US — then 2017 was the year in which the supporters of liberal openness scrambled to mobilise.

如果2016年是那些反对过去70年逐步建立起来的以规则为基础的自由世界秩序的人在国家层面上(英国和美国)取得了惊人胜利的一年，那么2017年就是自由开放秩序的支持者奋起反击的一年。

2018 is set to be the year they confront one another. As governments harness state power for their respective sides, tension long simmering within each country morphs into a conflict between nations.

2018年，双方将正面对抗。随着各国政府利用国家权力各自为营，各国国内蓄势已久的紧张局面演变成了国与国之间的冲突。

Profound structural economic change in almost all rich countries had increasingly separated those who reaped the benefits from those of their fellow citizens the transformation had left behind.

在几乎所有富裕国家发生的深层结构性经济变化，使得既得利益阶层日益脱离了被这种转变遗忘的同胞。

In Brexit and Donald Trump’s election victory, self-declared champions of the left behind took control of the national agenda with a promise to break with the internationalist liberal order. In reaction, centrist leaders elsewhere — most explicitly, Emmanuel Macron in France — have had to define themselves as that order’s defenders.

在英国退欧和唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)成功当选美国总统的过程中，是自称维护被遗忘群体权益的那些人以打破国际自由秩序的承诺控制了国家议程。作为应对，其他国家的中间派领导人——最突出的是法国的埃马纽埃尔•马克龙(Emmanuel Macron)——不得不把自己定义为自由秩序的捍卫者。

EU institutions and many European governments, together with Canada and Japan, now make up an avowedly liberal internationalist camp working to defend a multilateral system of collaborative rules-based governance for economic openness to mutual advantage.

欧盟各机构和欧洲很多政府、再加上加拿大和日本，如今组成了公开的自由国际主义阵营，努力捍卫以协作规则为基础的互利性经济开放多边治理体系。

The anti-liberal front’s undisputed leader, meanwhile, is the US under President Trump. The best guide to his goals is a plain reading of his statements from the inaugural speech to the recent update of the national security strategy. It is a zero-sum world in which there cannot be economic winners without losers, and it is each country for itself. Both camps want to make, or remake, the world in their image.

与此同时，反自由主义阵营无可争议的领袖是特朗普治下的美国。读一读他从就职演讲到最新国家安全战略的各项声明，就能明白他的目标。这是一个零和世界，他们笃信在经济上没有输家就不可能有赢家，每个国家各自为战。两个阵营都希望以自己的设想塑造或重塑这个世界。

It is not the first time that whole nations have had to choose which ideology to rally behind. The same happened in the 1930s, and again during the cold war. Then, too, countries aligned along ideological divides, partly fuelled by economic and social conflict that had previously riven their domestic politics. As a result the battle shifted to the international stage where it was waged by all means including war, direct or by proxy.

这并不是第一次出现所有国家都不得不选择支持哪种意识形态的情况。上世纪30年代曾出现同样的局面，冷战时期又再一次出现。当时，各个国家也是根据意识形态的分歧(部分是因为之前已经撕裂国内政治的经济和社会冲突而产生)站队。结果是斗争转移到国际舞台上，以直接战争或代理人战争等各种形式开战。

Within countries the conflict was to some extent repressed, as governments tried to ensure the side they had picked internationally was not undermined at home. For liberal states, this meant varying degrees of suppression of sympathy with fascism or communism. In dictatorships of the right and left, the elimination of dissenting views was total.

在国家内部，冲突在某种程度上被压制，各国政府努力确保他们在国际上选择的一方在国内不受动摇。对于自由主义国家而言，这意味着不同程度地压制对法西斯主义或共产主义的同情。在右翼和左翼的独裁制国家，这意味着消除异见。

There is no sign that the current global realignment will cause war between the camps; and we may still hope that political violence within nations can be avoided. But in three other arenas, the battle is on.

眼下没有迹象表明目前的全球重新站队将引发两个阵营的战争;我们或许也仍然能够对避免各国内部政治暴力抱有希望。但是在其他三个领域，战斗已打响。

One is international institutions, in particular those in charge of global economic governance. The Trump administration seems determined to undermine the World Trade Organization, whose arbitration function it is sabotaging by frustrating the appointment of judges to the appellate panel. Conversely, the EU and Japan are trying to demonstrate the organisation’s value to US interests by offering a united front in a WTO context against a perceived abusive trade policy by China.

国际机构是其中一个战场，特别是那些负责全球经济治理的机构。特朗普政府似乎下定决心要削弱世界贸易组织(WTO)的影响力，通过阻挠为WTO上诉机构任命法官来破坏WTO的仲裁功能。相反，欧盟和日本则试图通过在WTO框架下提供统一战线，对抗其认为的中国滥用贸易政策的行为，以此展示该组织对美国利益的价值。

Another arena is alliance building. The shock of isolationist victories accelerated work on deepening the existing global economic order. The EU has completed free trade agreements with Japan and Canada, and intensified talks with Mexico, Australia and New Zealand. Japan and Canada, besides tying up with the EU, are pushing forward the Trans-Pacific Partnership with the remaining 11 members after the US abandoned it.

另一个战场是结盟。孤立主义获胜的冲击加速了深化现有全球经济秩序的工作。欧盟已经与日本和加拿大签订了自由贸易协定，并加强了与墨西哥、澳大利亚和新西兰的磋商。除了与欧盟联手外，日本和加拿大还在美国放弃《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(TPP)后，与其余11个成员国一起推进该协定。

As for Mr Trump, he seems more eager to build bridges with Vladimir Putin’s Russia and befriend autocrats from the Philippines to Saudi Arabia than to shore up relationships with allies or maintain the political unity of Nato. In Europe, Hungary and Poland — the jury is out on Austria — are tilting towards his camp.

至于特朗普，他似乎更急于与弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)领导的俄罗斯建立桥梁，并与从菲律宾到沙特阿拉伯的独裁者交朋友，而非巩固与盟友的关系或保持北约(Nato)的政治团结。在欧洲，匈牙利和波兰——奥地利目前还说不准——正在向特朗普阵营倾斜。

Paradoxically, the most important arena for governments engaged in a global ideological battle remains their own public at home. This third dimension is decisive if the cold war is anything to go by. Communism was boosted by the great depression, but later could not indefinitely survive the evidence that it simply did not perform as well for its people as liberal-democratic capitalism. Conversely today, populist nationalism derives much of its strength from a mishandled financial crisis and mismanaged (often non-existent) policy responses to rapid structural change.

矛盾的是，对于参与全球意识形态斗争的政府来说，最重要的战场仍然是国内公众。如果冷战有任何参考价值的话，那就是这个第三战场将起到决定性作用。共产主义的发展受到了大萧条的推动，但后来仍无法无限期地挺过一个事实——对于其人民来说，其表现不如自由民主资本主义。相反，如今民粹民族主义大部分的力量都来自于政府对金融危机的处置不当及其在应对快速结构变化时的糟糕政策(往往是没有应对政策)。

In the long term, liberals have cause for hope: withdrawing from the liberal order will surely bring lasting harm to countries where isolationists are now in charge. But that hope is vulnerable to two threats. First, if the liberal order unravels, early withdrawers may hold the advantage. Second, the anti-liberals may show short-term economic results for longer than liberals can stay in power — in part because they are free from the pieties of conventional policy.

从长远来看，自由主义者有理由抱有希望：退出自由主义秩序必然会给那些如今由孤立主义者掌权的国家带来持久伤害。但是这一希望面临着两个威胁。首先，如果自由主义秩序崩溃，早期的退出者可能占据优势。其次，反自由主义者展示的短期经济结果，可能比自由主义者当权的时间更长久——部分是因为前者不受传统政策的影响。

While conflicts remained domestic, caution was harmful but sustainable. That luxury is gone. In a global battle of ideas, liberals must show urgently that the existing order can be made to work for everyone. The 1930s and the cold war both saw economic liberalism survive by becoming radically more progressive than before. It is time for such a bold, centrist radicalism again.

当冲突仍然停留在国内时，谨慎虽然有害但可持续。如今，这种奢侈的时光已经结束了。在全球意识形态大战中，自由主义者必须抓紧时间，证明现有秩序可以为所有人服务。上世纪30年代和冷战时期都见证了这一点：经济自由主义通过比之前大为激进地进步而挺了过来。现在又是大胆的中间派激进主义大展拳脚的时候了。