LUV达沃斯

Here are further glimpses of the Davos kaleidoscope.

以下是达沃斯万花筒的另外几个景象。

First, my friend Moises Naim, editor of Foreign Policy, gave me a new acronym on the global recovery. It is LUV. The L is for the L-shaped recovery of the European economies. The U is for the U-shaped recovery of the US economy. The V is for the shape of the recovery of big emerging economies.

首先，我的朋友、《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)杂志主编莫塞斯·奈姆(Moises Naim)告诉了我一个有关全球复苏的新缩略语：LUV。L代表欧洲各经济体的L型复苏，U代表美国经济的U型复苏，而V代表大型新兴经济体的复苏形态。

This looks depressingly right to me. In particular, the eurozone seems to have decided on an adjustment to its huge internal imbalances that is loaded entirely on the weak countries of the periphery. But the periphery cannot adjust if the core - namely, Germany - does not adjust too, by expanding demand. Neither the ECB nor the German government seems to understand this simple point, though one coalition partner - the FDP - does seem to do so.

在我看来，这种表述既正确，又令人郁闷。尤其是，欧元区似乎决定对其巨大的内部失衡进行调整，而调整负担完全压在周边的虚弱国家上。但是，除非欧元区核心（即德国）扩张需求，从而也走上调整的道路，否则欧元区周边是无法调整的。欧洲央行(ECB)和德国政府似乎都不理解这一简单的道路，尽管德国执政联盟中的自由民主党(FDP)似乎明白这一点。

Second, the global attempt at addressing imbalances - the “mutual assessment programme” being orchestrated by the International Monetary Fund - may well run into the sand this year. That would be a great pity.

其次，旨在解决失衡的全球层面努力——国际货币基金组织(IMF)策划的“相互评估计划”(mutual assessment programme)——今年很可能会不了了之。那将是一个很大的不幸。

What is needed is political commitment at a high level. The concern is that, with the crisis largely over, the will to take on difficult issues - exchange rates, for example - will disappear. It was easy for everybody to agree to expand spending and ease monetary policy last year. Now it all gets harder. It would be depressing if top politicians forgot how close the world economy came to disaster just over a year ago. But they may well do so, all the same.

目前需要的是高层的政治承诺。人们的担心在于，随着金融危机基本上告终，应对棘手问题（如汇率）的意志将会消失。去年，各国很容易同意扩大支出，放松货币政策。现在，一切都会变得更加艰难。如果高层政界人士忘记世界经济仅在一年多以前是多么接近灾难边缘，那将是令人郁闷的。但这些人很可能还是会忘记。

Third, the relationship between the US and China is widely accepted as central. These behemoths look quite similar. Both can respond well to crisis, but neither seems able to deal with long-term structural weaknesses. China's failures centre on its over-reliance on investment and exports, the adverse shift in income distribution, away from households, and the extraordinarily low share of consumption in GDP. US failures are well-known, too: energy policy, for example. Welcome to the policy gridlock of Chimerica.

第三，人们普遍承认，美国与中国的关系处于中心地位。这两个庞然大物看上去颇为相似。两国面对危机都能作出很好的反应，但似乎都不能应对长远的结构弱点。中国的失败之处主要在于过度依赖投资和出口、不利于家庭的收入分配转移，以及消费占国内生产总值(GDP)的比重异常之低。美国的失败之处也是人们所熟知的，能源政策就是一例。欢迎来到“中美国”(Chimerica)的政策僵局。

Fourth, I am increasingly concerned that stimulus - especially fiscal stimulus - will be withdrawn too soon. We must remember that the developed countries still have enormous slack in their economties. It is not clear that a withdrawal of fiscal stimulus would - or even could - be adequately offset by monetary policy.

第四，我越来越担心刺激措施（尤其是财政刺激措施）可能撤销得过早。我们必须记住，发达经济体内部仍存在严重的不景气。目前尚不清楚，财政刺激撤销后，货币政策是否将（或者说能够）充分弥补缺口。

Finally, I am listening to Lawrence Summers as I write. He has emphasised that we cannot maintain global integration if it is seen as a source of domestic disintegration. This tension - that between the global economy and domestic politics - is a central challenge of our time. It affects everything we try to do.

最后，我着笔之际正在听白宫经济顾问劳伦斯·萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)发表讲话。他强调指出，如果全球一体化被视为国内解体的源头，我们就不能保持全球一体化进程。全球经济与国内政治之间的这种紧张态势，是我们这个时代的中心挑战。它影响着我们要做的每一件事。

本文为作者为FT.com撰写的博客。

译者/和风